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This thesis examines how three Lebanese satellite stations and two print journals cover 
the Syrian civil war.  It is useful to analyze Lebanon’s news programming because the relative 
lack of regulation over its media allows them to take drastically different political stances.  Syria 
and Lebanon’s unique political and cultural connection causes the conflict to permeate both the 
debates over foreign and domestic policy.  My paper is significant because it elucidates the 
specific ways in which the Syrian crisis divides the already fractured Lebanese populace.  My 
analysis reveals how regional news sources give meaning to the Arab Spring using language 
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At various points in its history, Lebanon has been described alternatively as a failed 
nation, a failed nation-state, and a failed state.  The literature on its history and politics is 
dominated by accounts of sectarian division,1 an anemic state apparatus,2 and geographic borders 
that have been respected by neither its neighbors nor its nationals.3  An enduring point of 
contention has been Lebanon’s relationship with Syria.  Accounts of Lebanon’s founding 
emphasize the fact that when France and England assumed control of the former Ottoman 
territories, their diplomats drew Lebanon’s borders with a concern primarily for creating a 
territory that would protect the interests of its Christian communities.  As a result, some residents 
of the Syrian and Lebanese territories continue to question Lebanon’s legitimacy as a country 
within the prevailing global discourse of the nation-state.  
 In this study, I look at the discourse in Lebanese media surrounding the Syrian crisis that 
began in 2011.  For the purpose of this study, I have chosen to look at media produced within the 
geographic borders of Lebanon that possess a target audience that lives within those same 
boundaries.  Though the research questions that I address relate closely to the concepts of 
national identity and nationalism, I am not aiming to treat Lebanon and Syria or even “Lebanese” 
and “Syrian” as points of identification that are internally consistent or mutually exclusive.  As 
my analysis of “Lebanese” media suggests, each media source projects a shifting and 
inconsistent representation of what it means to be Syrian or Lebanese.  In other words, the media 
sources not only conflict with each other over what these concepts encompass, but within a given 
media source, uses of these concepts contradict and bleed into each other.  The building 
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conflagration of Syria’s civil war has thrown these concepts into sharp relief and motivated 
speakers to emphasize their differences. 
 My thesis contributes to theoretical approaches to Lebanon because I look at the ways in 
which news on Lebanon and Syria mitigate the Scyllas and Charibdisses of the Lebanese 
discursive field, avoiding language that could alienate their target audiences while also 
attempting to maintain the narrative cohesion of their news coverage.   To discuss how 
communities are imagined in the news without, at least, a brief mention of Benedict Anderson 
would be difficult.  Though this project does look at the ways in which communities are 
imagined and re-imagined in a country’s media, it does so with the intent of complicating the 
deterministic framework within which Anderson addressed this issue.   
My approach also aims to rework the dualistic nature with which many theoretic 
approaches to nationalism consider a nation to be real or imagined and a nation-state project to 
be successful or unsuccessful.45  In order to rework Anderson’s conception of how the national 
identity is promoted in media, I introduce Slavoj Zizek’s skepticism about the ability of a 
community to develop shared understandings of a concept’s meaning.  Zizek’s approach to the 
“subject” is particularly useful and illuminating when applied to the construction of Lebanese 
identity, because he defines the subject as a negation that in trying to constitute itself is doomed 
to failure.6  Zizek considers this failure to be the inevitable result of any attempt to construct 
subjectivity, and Lebanon’s history seems to adhere to his idea of the subject as negation.      
 My thesis contributes to academic work on media because there have been few 
comparative and detailed content analyses of media in Lebanon.  It compares how various 
Lebanese print and television news sources cover the ongoing civil war in Syria.  The historical, 
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cultural, and geographic links between the two countries cause the unrest in Syria to have major 
significance in Lebanese politics.  These links also contribute to a polarizing effect within 
Lebanese society.  As a result, Lebanon’s diverse media sources portray news coming from Syria 
in starkly different ways.  This topic is important because it both identifies Lebanese political 
schisms, and it shows how the conflict in Syria is affecting the political discourse in Lebanon.  
 My thesis first identifies the differences in coverage, and secondly, discusses potential 
reasons for these differences.  My beginning hypothesis is that the divergence in coverage is 
closely linked to the media sources’ political linkages and ownership.  I am also beginning with 
the assumption that the news sources skew their coverage in a way that supports their positions 
on domestic issues.   
	  
A History of Lebanon’s Media Since 1990 
 Since 1990, Lebanon has become a key player in the production of Arabic language 
media.  In his book on reality television, Marwan Kraidy describes how Lebanese media talent 
plays a crucial role in media production flows of the Arab world.7  In an article on state 
regulation of television in Lebanon, Kraidy explains the important role that Lebanese news 
sources have played in informing not only Lebanese citizens but the Arab world in general.  The 
Lebanese periodical as-Safir’s mantra captures this relationship: “Lebanon’s news in the Arab 
world and the Arab world’s news in Lebanon.” 
 The early 1990’s were characterized by government attempts to control media outlets in 
order to create stability after the chaos of the country’s 15-year civil war.  Between 1990 and 
1993 the Lebanese government closed three television stations and several newspapers.8  
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Originally founded by a Christian political party, the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation 
maintained a tense relationship with the Lebanese government due to the station’s critical stance 
with regard to Lebanon’s relationship with Syria.  The television station claimed that it was 
being targeted due to its Christian affiliation.9   
 In 1994 the National Council of Audio-Visual Media was established by the newly 
passed Audio-Visual law.  The law established a categorization system for media outlets and set 
several regulations.  A regulation that is extremely important for this paper is one that requires 
all television news bulletins to be objective and inclusive.10  This stipulation was used to 
prosecute and close stations that aired programming that the government felt was biased or 
inflammatory.  In 1996, the government decided to close 56 television stations and reduced the 
number of officially sanctioned stations to four: Future, Murr Television, Lebanese Broadcasting 
Corporation International, and The National Broadcasting Network.11  Three of the stations were 
owned by top officials in the government representing different religious communities within 
Lebanon.    The government allowed Future and LBCI to broadcast via satellite, but banned them 
from broadcasting news programming abroad.  Al-Manar was given special permission to 
broadcast news about conflicts with Israel in 1996, and in 2000, it received governmental 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  (Kraidy,	  Broadcasting	  Regulation	  and	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Postwar	  Lebanon	  1998,	  489)	  
10	  (El	  Richani	  2013,	  73)	  
11	  (Kraidy,	  Broadcasting	  Regulation	  and	  Civil	  Society	  in	  Postwar	  Lebanon	  1998,	  489)	  





Sources for Data Analysis 
My study focuses on five Lebanese media outlets.  Three of the media sources will be 
news broadcasts that are archived on the websites of the Lebanese Broadcast Corporation (LBC), 
Murr Television (MTV), and al-Manar. LBC, the first private television station in Lebanon, was 
originally founded by members of the Christian rightists Lebanese Forces Party, but currently, 
Saudi Prince Bin Talal and Rupert Murdoch own a majority of the corporation.  MTV was 
founded in 1991, but due to Syrian political intervention was forced to close between 2002 and 
2009.1314  Al-Manar began broadcasting in 1991, but because of its affiliation with Hezbollah, it 
has been banned in several countries.15  It has the stated objective of opposing the Israeli 
occupation of Arab territories.16  
 The other two sources are the print versions of al-Mustaqbal and As-Safir that have been 
posted to the database Library Pressdisplay.  Al-Mustaqbal is sponsored by Rafik Hariri’s Future 
movement, and as-Safir has historically been associated with pan-Arab tendencies within 
Lebanon.   
  An-Nahar is a left-of-center periodical from Lebanon that was founded in 1933 by 
Gebran Tueni. During the time of the Iranian Revolution it operated with relatively little 
government supervision.  Though the periodical focuses on local politics, it covers a large 
amount of international news.  The paper is fairly open about its bias when it interprets events. 
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Jerusalem Post is an English-language periodical published in Israel.  The paper had a 
slight leftist bias, and was originally published as the Palestine Post.  The paper focuses on 
international news, and Arab-Israeli relations in particular.   
The Baghdad Observer was an English daily published by the Iraqi government. 
The strengths of my sources are that they are major sources of news for Lebanese citizens 
and they represent a wide array of ownership, political dispositions, and religious affiliations.  
The main weakness of my sources is that they are online and may not be available on a 
permanent or consistent basis.   
 
	   Methodology 
In this project, I look primarily at news produced for consumption within Lebanon, 
paying special attention to how the conflict in Syria is covered. I have done a content analysis of 
nightly news broadcasts from three of Lebanon’s main media outlets.  I also performed a similar 
analysis of two print sources.  I paid attention to the total length of programs, the amount of 
time/space spent on Syrian news, the total number of stories presented, the number of stories 
related to Syria, the stories that are prioritized, the sources cited, the people interviewed, and the 
issues covered. 
My study focuses on the broadcasts clustered around two significant periods in the course 
of the Syrian conflict.  The first period is mid-December of 2012 when there was an increase in 
the level of violence within Syria and Bashar al-Assad issued arrest warrants for Lebanese 
politicians who supplied Syrian rebels with weapons.  The second period was the second week in 
February 2013.  The large time gap between the two samples is because during the viewing 




To analyze the news coverage, I viewed over 600 minutes of news footage taking notes 
on story length, order, framing and subject.  This footage represents 18 episodes of nightly 
broadcasts from al-Manar, LBC, and MTV collected from six different nights.  I initially 
separated the stories into four categories based on their subject matter and setting: Lebanon, 
Syria, Arab World, and International.   In deciding which news was specifically about the Syrian 
crisis, I used two main criteria: whether the story took place in Syria and whether it involved 
actors responding to the events there.  After viewing the footage, a third category, which 
encompassed stories primarily about Lebanese actors’ responses to the Syrian crisis became 
apparent. 
My research on print media focused on how news articles related to Syria developed over 
the month of January.  I looked at their length, position in the journal, their subject, how they 
framed the issue, and what sources were cited.  I looked specifically at how these attributes 
changed or remained the same throughout the month. 
The data for this section was collected from issues of al-Mustaqbal and as-Safir printed 
during the first two weeks of January 2013 and the first week of February of that same year.  All 
of the articles related to the Syrian crisis printed during the month of January were collected and 
read for general tone.  Next, all of the articles that dealt with Syria and appeared on the front 
page during the first two weeks of January were selected and analyzed in depth.  An article was 
considered to be about Syria if one of the words in the headline was directly linked to Syria.   
The analysis focused primarily on portrayals of the Syrian regime, opposition groups, 
civilians, refugees, and international actors.  Attention was paid to how Lebanese and 
international actors were presented.  Each time these groups were mentioned they were 




out whether they were being portrayed positively or negatively.  An attempt was also made to 
see what words were generally associated with a given group.  In order to see how the story 
developed over time, all of the front-page articles about Syria from the first week of February 
were analyzed using this method.  Articles were collected from two separate time periods in 
order to see if framing remained constant or shifted over time. 
One major challenge in analyzing both the print and television media was conducting the 
research in Arabic.  To reduce issues of translation as much as possible, most of the notes on the 
sources were recorded in Arabic using the same word choice as the source.  This was particularly 
difficult with the broadcast sources because it was sometimes difficult to identify individual 
words due to the speed with which the speaker spoke.  This was primarily a problem when 
reporters conducted street interviews.  When a section was particular difficult to understand, 
native Arabic speakers were consulted. 
The twin approach to my methodology enables me to examine different dimensions of 
how the Syrian conflict is covered in Lebanese news.  By focusing on the nightly news 
broadcasts from a short time-period, I am able to examine how the conflict is situated among 
other news stories.  This context reveals how the conflict in Syria is harmonized with the 
discourse surrounding other international events as well as domestic Lebanese issues.  
 Differences between how the television stations describe social movements in other 
Middle Eastern countries elucidate differences in the way that they cover the Syrian conflict.  
Also, the juxtaposition of stories about Syria with stories about domestic issues reveals 
convergence and disjuncture between how the stations conceptualize the relationship between 




 My analysis of print media examines articles printed over the course of a month.  This 
tactic enables me to compare how the discourse around Syria evolved in two papers with 
differing political orientations.  While my analysis of the news broadcasts provides information 
about news about Syria is made to fit into the stations’ broader discourse about world and 
domestic events, my analysis of print media shows how narratives are forged in an evolving 
process that must rationalize or ignore new events that seem to undermine their consistency.  
In order to provide a broader context within which to think about coverage of the Syrian 
crisis in Lebanon, the third chapter steps back temporally and geographically by conducting a 
comparison between a Lebanese periodical and three other regional periodicals. It specifically 
looks at how protests in Iran were covered in 1978.  This chapter provides the opportunity to 
discuss some of the characteristics of Lebanese media that seem to have remained constant over 
time.  It also provides the opportunity to explore some of the aspects that distinguish coverage of 














Chapter 1: Literary, Historical, and Theoretic Context 
 In this chapter I give a review of previous studies that have conducted content analyses of 
news sources, give a brief history of Syrian-Lebanese relations with a focus on the period after 
2000, and discuss different ways of conceptualizing the Lebanese public sphere that could 
inform a study of its media. 
Literature on Framing 
In addition to analyzing the language and subject content of Lebanese news media I 
intend to analyze how news stories are framed.  Dimitrova and Connnoly-Ahearn define framing 
as “an organizing mechanism for media content,” that “provides an immediate context to the 
recipient of the frame through selection, emphasis or exclusion of specific facts or ideas.” 17  This 
paper uses this definition as a base for its analysis.    
One problem in doing a frame analysis is that authors often develop individual 
methodologies to suit their particular studies.18  Pan and Kosicki identify four structures that can 
be looked at during a frame analysis: Synthetic, Script, Thematic and Rhetoric.  Synthetic 
structures represent word choice, Script structures refer to the evaluation of worthiness, thematic 
structures looks at causal themes, and rhetorical structures represent the stylistic choices of a 
journalist.  This framework is helpful in explaining the general categories that combine to form a 
frame, but is not very useful in identifying specific frames. 
 Gramson and Lasch, in their article on perceptions of Sadam Hussein’s trial describe 
some more specific elements that go into forming a frame when they give a non-exhaustive 
typology of seven such elements.  The elements that they identify are Exemplars, Catchphrases, 
Depictions, and Roots.  Exemplars are dramatized accounts that refer to past events, while 
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catchphrases are single words or brief statements that are used to refer to recurrent themes or 
ideas.  An example of an Exemplar would be the use of the year 1982 in the context of Syrian.  
This year connects President Bashar Al-Assad’s current repressive military actions to the much 
more extreme actions of his father during the Hama uprising.  An example of a catchphrase 
would be the use of the term fitna to describe a pervasive fear that the social bonds will dissolve 
resulting in violent state of disorder.  Depictions are symbols, metaphors and moral terms that 
become associated with the principle subject.  An example of a Depiction would be the frequent 
use of the words “human suffering” which appeals to the moral obligation to protect innocents.  
Finally, Roots are descriptions that provide historical context that provide causal links for present 
events.  These elements in combination determine the valence of a story or its overall tone, 
which is useful in determining the overall frame. 
 D’angelo develops specific types of frames that can be identified based on the content of 
stories.19  A few examples are Prognostic, Diagnostic, Anti-war, Media self-referential, and 
Responsibility frames.  A Prognostic frame focuses on future effects, while Diagnostic frame 
focuses on the reasons leading to an event.   A Media self-referential frame focuses on the role of 
the media in creating, sustaining, or ending a conflict.  A Responsibility frame seeks to assign 
blame to the parties who are causing a problem or are failing to solve it. 
 This paper combines these methodologies by identifying the recurrent themes in 
Lebanese coverage of Syria, and using the elements identified by Pan and Kosicki to develop 
recurrent frames similar to those of Gramson and Lasch.  It looks primarily at the content of new 
stories to find what their major themes are, and then identify which themes recur most 
frequently.  It then compares the frequency of these themes across media outlets. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 Relatively little academic research has been done on the content of Lebanese media.  The 
two most detailed studies of Lebanese media are Marwan Kraidy’s Reality Television and Arab 
Politics: Contention in Public Life and Katharina Notzold’s Defining the Nation?: Lebanese 
Media and Political Elites (1990-2005).2021  Kraidy’s work limited itself primarily to 
entertainment media of the Arab world, but dedicated a considerable amount of attention to 
Lebanese television.  He theorizes that reality television has become a locus for the general 
public to become involved with debates about identity and representation.22  Notzold, on the 
other hand, presents a far more pessimistic picture implying that television news is an arena for 
political elites to present their view of the world.23  In a book chapter on the same topic, she 
concludes “In fact, Lebanese news contributes little to shared experiences of people living in 
Lebanese society, and the current state of Lebanese news cannot have any integrative 
functions.”24  While Notzold’s conclusion may have been true prior to 2005, it is helpful to 
ascertain the repercussions of  the major political realignments that have taken place both after 
Syria’s military withdrawal in 2005 and after the near collapse of the Syrian ruling regime over 
the past three years.  My study is an important contribution to the field because there has been 
very little analysis of Lebanese media since the instability in Syria contributed to a fundamental 
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Lebanon as an independent political unit was first established in 1943 with the end of the 
French mandate.  Its independence was never fully respected by successive regimes in Syria, and 
factions within Lebanon showed varying degrees of support to the Lebanese states apparatus.  
Internal instability in combination with Syrian pressure allowed Palestinian militants to gain 
numbers and influence within Lebanon.25  A failed attempt by the Lebanese army to neutralize 
the military wing of the Palestinian Liberation Organization led Christian groups to begin 
organizing their own militias.26  Soon, the Lebanese government was paralyzed by trying to 
maintain the participation of factions whose interests could not be reconciled.  As a result of the 
state’s incapacity, paramilitary groups increasingly engaged in violent acts that frequently 
resulted in civilian death. By 1976, Lebanon was in a civil war that would last 15 years. 
The Lebanese Civil War was ended in 1990 when the Syrian army gained primacy in the 
territory. The Syrian President, Hafiz al-Assad, ruled Lebanon from Damascus with tacit US 
approval.  Assad considered Lebanon and Syria to be “one people with two states.”27  A unity 
government constructed by Syria supervised the disarming of Lebanese militias. The government 
structure was based on the permanently allotting certain sects certain governmental positions.  
The president would always be Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni, and the Speaker of the 
Parliament Shi’i.  Due to a financial crisis in 1992, Syria reluctantly allowed Rafiq Hariri to 
become prime minister because of his connections to Saudi financial backers. As prime minister, 
Hariri’s relationship with Assad and other members of the Lebanese government remained tepid.  
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When Bashar al-Assad began to manage Lebanese affairs in late 1998, he engaged in a failed 
maneuver to push Hariri out of government.28 
2000 was a year of transition for Lebanon because Hafiz al-Assad died less than a month 
after Israel withdrew from the “Security Zone” it had occupied during the civil war in southern 
Lebanon.  Israel’s withdrawal allowed for Hezbollah to expand its influence in the region.  
Bashar al-Assad’s ascension to the presidency also upset the balance of power within Lebanon as 
local politicians adjusted to his more intrusive style of governing.29  Power relations with various 
Lebanese actors never stabilized, and Hariri cooperated with Druze leader Walid Junblat to 
oppose Syrian influence.  They were upset with what they saw as the Lebanese state apparatus 
acting as an increasingly intrusive extension of Assad’s regime. Until 2003, the US was 
complicit with regards to Syrian-Lebanese relations, but after antagonism between US President 
George W. Bush and Bashar al-Assad increased due to the Iraq war, the US and the UN began to 
pressure Syrian to withdraw its army from Lebanon.  In September of 2004, this pressure 
culminated with UN Security Council Resolution 1559, which called for a withdrawal of Syrian 
troops.  On February 2, a group of opposition Lebanese politicians, covertly organized by Hariri, 
passed legislation officially calling for Syrian withdrawal.  Less than two weeks later, Hariri died 
in a car bomb. 
The Hariri assassination launched a series of Christian protests leading to the resignation 
of the Assad supported Prime Minister on February 28.  On March 8, about 500,000 pro-Syrian 
Lebanese citizens organized a protest.30  In response to this large show of support for Syria, 
Christians, Sunnis, and Druze organized a protest of 1 million on March 14.  The massive show 
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of antagonism allowed the US to increase its pressure, and Syria withdrew the last of its forces 
on April 26. 
In elections that took place after the Syrian withdrawal political coalitions took the names 
of the two large protests that occurred after Hariri’s death.  The predominantly Shi’i supporters 
of Syrian influence became the March 8 alliance while the Christian-Sunni-Druze alliance 
became known as the March 14 alliance.  The latter won a majority in elections, but politics 
proved unstable, and Michel Aoun’s Christian group, the Free Patriot Movement, eventually 
defected from March 14 to join March 8.  
Asserting its independence vis-à-vis the Lebanese state and its courage vis-à-vis Israel, 
Hezbollah crossed the Israeli border and abducted two Israeli soldiers.  This sparked a five-week 
series of retaliations between the Israeli government and Hezbollah, which resulted in massive 
destruction to Lebanese infrastructure in the country’s southern border.  Political conflicts 
between March 8 and March 14 continued to increase until the majority of March 8 politicians 
that were a part of the government withdrew in protest of March 14’s support of an international 
tribunal to prosecute those responsible for Rafiq Hariri’s death in 2006.   March 14’s control 
over government became even more tenuous when Junblat and his followers ended their support 
for March 14 in 2010.  Since the outbreak of fighting in Syria, the political process in Lebanon 
has continued to be characterized by deadlock.   The most recent debate that political parties 
were deciding was whether to have elections or write new election laws first. 
 
The Nation and Media 
While Benedict Anderson looked primarily at the ways in which states used bounded 




in which language is as much a wedge that divides people who ascribe to Syrian and Lebanese 
identities as it is a factor that unites them.  Anderson (1983) writes, “What the eye is to the lover 
– that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born with – language – whatever language history has 
made his or her mother-tongue – is to the patriot.”31   Anderson’s ideas resemble the pan-Arab 
ideals of Nasser and some of his predecessors,3233 but recent history has seen pan-Arab 
movements all but lose their former ebullience.34  Today, the Arabic language remains a factor 
that unites diverse communities within Lebanon to each other as much as it unites communities 
in Lebanon to the larger Arab world.  Arabic creates the potential for a single and exclusive 
national identity that includes people living with the territories of Lebanon and Syria, but in no 
way dictates its success.  My study shows how media diversity allows for different imaginings of 
national identities to coexist simultaneously within a single language community and reflects 
some of the Slavoj Zizek’s assertions about identity.35 
In studies of identity in the Middle East it has also become popular to look at the ways in 
which state structures have attempted to “create” national identities that did not exist previously, 
but the combination of weak state institutions and strong familial ties cause Lebanon not to 
adhere to this conceptualization of state consolidation and nation formation.  Fred Halliday and 
other authors have referred to this as the “incubator” model where states create the bureaucratic 
and geographic frames of reference within which a national identity can be developed.3637   Much 
work has been done on how the process developed in Jordan, Syria, and Turkey.38394041  In 
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general these processes agree with what Anderson described as the state’s use of “official 
nationalism” to promote the state first and foremost.42  Lebanon, however, is usually 
characterized as being an outlier in the region.  
Literature on Lebanon emphasizes the relatively limited success of the Lebanese 
government to build institutions that scholars studying nationalism have traditionally viewed as 
being instrumental in the promotion of a national identity.  They emphasize Lebanon’s weak 
official army, the government’s limited provision of public goods, and its devolution of family 
law to religious communities.43   While I recognize the relatively limited role that the central 
government plays in promoting a unified conception of national identity, my analysis reveals 
how the imagined communities that are promoted in media must act in dialog with the presence 
of a Lebanese state and political arena.  The state may not play the primary role in defining and 
promoting a national identity, and efforts to define national identity may be plural and 
contradictory, but there exists a consensus that Lebanon as an entity exists as a point (among 
others) of identification for its citizens. 
Taking an Andersonian approach, the plurality characteristic of Lebanon is maintained by 
the fractured nature of the media sector.  Until the state attempted to reform the market in 1996, 
there were over 60 privately owned television stations broadcasting from the country.44  The 
state reduced this number and instituted restrictions on the type of content that stations could air, 
but the control exercised by the Lebanese state over its media sector is negligible in comparison 
to other states in the Middle East.  The lack of a single official media outlet means that contrary 
to Bendedict Anderson’s model, there was little opportunity for the state to promote an official 
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state nationalism.45  As a result, multiple definitions of Lebanon could persist and become 
engrained in the citizenry.  That the rights to own broadcast stations was distributed by the 
government in a semi-confessional manner further aided this process as the leading politicians 
created media outlets with programming that targeted their constituencies and reaffirmed their 
differing visions for Lebanon.46 
Slavoj Zizek’s insights into the nature of identity and the subject can help explain why 
the Syrian-imposed internal peace has remained relatively stable since 1990. In his attempt to 
synthesize the ideas of Georg Hegel and Jacques Lacan with those of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe, Zizek asserts a purely empty, negative conception of identity.  Borrowing from Laclau 
and Mouffe, he denies that the subject is “an essential entity, given in advance, dominating the 
social process.”47 He agrees with them that there are available different “subject-positions,” 
which have no preexisting or fixed meaning and are continually in a process of definition in 
relation to the shifting meanings of every other “subject-position” around them.   Zizek then tries 
to harmonize this negative conception of the subject with Hegel’s dialectic.  He concludes that 
the perceived antagonism between the self and the other, which is often perceived as being 
essential, is really just a projection by the self/subject onto the other generated by the self’s 
inability to constitute itself into the identity it believes it truly should be. 
If we use Zizek’s conception of the subject in theorizing the process of forming collective 
identities in Lebanon, we understand that “Lebanese,” like all national identities, is an empty 
subjectivity.  The antagonism that nations express or perceive towards other nations is really just 
an externalization of the insecurity they feel with respect to their own inability to fully constitute 
themselves into the ideal that they believe they should be.  The relatively non-intrusive nature of 
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Hafiz al-Assad’s rule in Lebanon allowed for this antagonism to resolve itself differently in the 
various media outlets.  There was less of a need for a shared public debate/conclusion about 
whether Lebanon was a Syrian territory; an independent state of Arabs; a Lebanese nation-state; 
or a multi-cultural autonomous polity.  The increased intrusion of Bashar al-Assad’s presidency 
brought these debates to the foreground because Lebanese citizens could not agree on whether 
his actions were legitimate.  This phenomenon resembles how Ottoman efforts at administrative 
reform during the beginning of the 20th century were a catalyst for Arab nationalist movements 
to become more active.4849  The potential dissolution of the Syrian state due to the ongoing civil 
war also poses a threat to the precarious balance between differing conceptions of the Lebanese 
identity. 
In many Arab countries, the social movements of the Arab Spring have been 
characterized by a breakdown of the top-down approach to defining the nation.  Aided by the 
proliferation of digital media, average citizens now generate and distribute media quickly to 
audiences of unprecedented sizes.50  This has created a discursive space where citizens in 
formerly repressive societies can talk not only to each other but also back to their repressive 
governments.  In Reality Television and Arab Politics: Contention in Public Life, Kraidy 
describes the Lebanese protests of 2005 as a moment where new media enabled and inspired 
Lebanese citizens to become active participants in determining the course of their society.51  In 
his opinion, it was a constitutive moment when Lebanese citizens formed associations in order to 
advocate for what they believed to be the proper relationship between their government and the 
Syrian regime.  He sees the participants’ displays of the Lebanese flag during protests as acts that 
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allowed them to claim simultaneously loyalty to the Lebanese entity and a stake in determining 
its nature.  Kraidy takes up the term “Independence Intifadah” and compares it to how 
Palestinians displayed a more generalized sense of responsibility for opposing the Israeli 
occupation. 
Ersun Kurtulus expresses a different opinion in the article “’Cedar Revolution’: Lebanese 
Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination.”  Kurtulus asserts that the 
protests were neither a revolution nor akin to the Palestinian intifadahs, because they resulted in 
a system that resembled the preexisting power arrangement more than it differed from it.52  
According to the article, the protests were less an expression of Lebanese unity than expressions 
of the fractious nature of identity politics in Lebanon.  He sees the protests as a failure of the 
Lebanese public sphere to advance the dispute over the definition of Lebanon’s status.  In 
describing the split in the Lebanese polity, he uses the term “independence-integration 
cleavage.”53  He asserts that the series of protests and resulting political alliances only deepened 
preexisting divisions between pro-Syria and pro-Lebanon factions. 
Both authors mischaracterize the significance of the March protest movements.  Kurtulus 
underestimates the significance that participants in both protest movements were disagreeing 
over what was in Lebanon’s best interest, and felt as though it was their right as citizens to 
express that opinion publically.  Kraidy overstates the depth of the changes that the protest 
movements embodied. 
In Interrogating the Real, Slavoj Zizek (2005) asserts that the type of public sphere that 
both Kriady and Kurtulus have in mind is impossibile.  According to Zizek both scholars seem to 
be assuming the potentiality of a “smooth communication” where the subjects “effectively mean 
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the same thing.” 54  He claims that this is impossible and undesirable because it hinges on a 
falsity: “presenting what we should strive for as already accomplished.”  March 14 was assuming 
that an independent entity, Lebanon, was being unfairly oppressed by Syria.  March 8 was 
assuming that Lebanon and Syria were already fused, and they were trying to prevent it from 
being severed.  The success of the protests, as Kraidy properly identifies, is that both movements 
embraced the symbol of the Lebanese flag, and by extension a claim to determine what it means 
to be Lebanese.  The failure, that Kurtulus mistakenly identifies as being the public sphere’s, is 
that both groups act as though the “Lebanon” they imagine is already in existence and that the 
other group wishes to destroy it or continue its suppression.  A true failure of the public sphere as 
defined by Kurtulus would have required that March 8 deny the existence of Lebanon and 
recognize only the Syrian identity.     
Whether or not Lebanese citizens adopt a consistently defined Lebanese national identity, 
they participate in a public sphere that is largely fixed by overlapping Lebanese political and 
economic arenas.55  Participation in this public sphere often requires even reluctant participants 
to acknowledge membership to a Lebanese polis that is somehow distinct from external groups. I 
suggest that debates over whether Lebanon is an authentic nation or a successful nation-state 
obscure the ways in which it has become a community of solidarity for its members.  While 
groups of Lebanese citizens may dispute the characteristics that define Lebanon as a community, 
they participate in that debate as a bounded community. 
The conflicts in Syria as well as the peaceful social movements developing in the Middle 
East have made the media’s distinction between Lebanon and non-Lebanon more palpable.  The 
need for a shared definition of Lebanon is becoming more urgent as Syria seems increasingly 
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posed for collapse.  Though shared demands for democratic opening and ending corruption unite 
citizens in Middle Eastern countries, most of these campaigns are being waged on the national 
scale using national symbols.  Polities in the Middle East are reconceiving existing state 
formations by reappropriating national discourse and infusing it with new ideals and priorities.  
This process is similar to the use of symbols to encourage and forge national identity that James 
Gelvin described in s his book, Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the 
Close of Empire. 56  Similar to the Syrian elites that were trying to promote Arab and Syrian 
identities during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, social movements in the Middle East are 
using shared national symbols to promote unity.   
The language of the Arab Spring has infiltrated the Lebanese public sphere as well.  
Lebanese institutions are receiving greater recognition from groups that were typically suspect of 
it.  Traditionally pro-Syrian news outlets resort to using language that acknowledges both the 
threat posed by external instability and the need for cooperation among Lebanon’s diverse 
political and cultural factions in order to avoid contagion.  This poses a danger as now, unlike the 
days of Hafiz al-Assad, a shared agreement on the process for defining “Lebanon” may be a 







	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Chapter 2: Nightly News Broadcasts 
 In this section I analyze the content of nightly news broadcasts from three Lebanese 
television stations.  These stations’ nightly news broadcasts are a useful source of information 
because they represent each station’s effort to condense an entire day’s news cycle into a single 
30 to 45-minute program.  In doing so, the producers make decisions as to which stories will 
receive coverage and how much coverage they will receive.  Additionally, the stories’ 
arrangement within the program is reflective of how producers perceive both the logical 
connections between them as well as their importance relative to each other.  These traits make a 
comparison between the nightly news broadcasts produced by different stations indicative of the 
different ways that Lebanese citizens can integrate world events into broader narratives. 
 I begin my analysis by looking at the amount and nature of coverage that each station 
assigned to the Syrian crisis.  I answer the question of how much time is dedicated to news 
related to Lebanon, Syria, and international affairs.  I then look at the typical sources and 
interviews used in the stations’ news stories, and discuss the effect these choices have on the 
types of narratives that can be constructed.  Next, I attempt to answer the question how the 
stations prioritize the news by analyzing the order of stories in their broadcasts.  I then attempt to 
answer the question of how the stations frame the situation in Syria by looking at the primary 
issues related to the conflict that they cover. I conclude the section by taking a close reading of 
purposively selected broadcasts from each station that seem to embody not only the way in 
which each station portrays the events in Syria but also how these portrayals of the Syrian crisis 







 Once the news coverage was broken into these categories, I calculated that based on the 
number of minutes allotted, about 20% of MTV’s coverage was related to Syria, 27% of LBC’s 
coverage was related to Syria, and 35% of al-Manar’s coverage related to Syria.  The most 
striking fact revealed by analyzing the amount of time dedicated to various geographic areas is 
that very little of al-Manar’s news stories were related to Lebanon.  Several of the broadcasts 
made no overt reference to Lebanon’s existence.  Additionally, almost all of the news that was 
not about Syria was related other Arab-majority states.  In contrast, 39% of LBC’s coverage and 
57% of MTV’s coverage was related to Lebanon.  In the table below, some stories were counted 
more than once due to their content straddling categories.   
Table	  1:	  Regional	  breakdown	  of	  news	  coverage 
 MTV LBC al-Manar 
News Related to Syria 20% 27% 35% 
News Related to 
Lebanon 
57% 39% 6% 
News Related to Both 
Syria and Lebanon 
15% 9% 2% 
News Related to 
other Arab countries 
6% 17% 60% 
News about non-
Arab countries 
32% 29% 2% 
N 230 minutes (6 
Broadcasts) 
160 minutes (6 
Broadcasts) 






What is most striking about these figures is the difference in relative importance that 
Syria and Lebanon play in MTV’s and LBC’s coverage.   The difference between MTV’s 
coverage of Lebanon and its coverage of Syria is 37% while that same figure for LBC is only 
12%.  Additionally, only 5% of MTV’s coverage is dedicated stories that relate only to Syria at 
the exclusion of Lebanon while nearly 18% of LBC’s stories relate exclusively to Syria.  These 
figures seem to suggest that Syria receives greater priority in LBC’s coverage while MTV 
focusses more on Lebanese news.  It also interesting to note the near opposite ratios that MTV 
and al-Manar possess in relation to the amount of time they spend on Lebanon versus the rest of 
the Arab world. 
 
Sources 
 All of the stations reference a diverse array of sources when presenting stories, but each 
one uses different concentrations of types of sources.  I categorized the types of sources based 
primarily on the organizations that they represent. The major types of sources that I identify are 
unofficial eye-witnesses, political figures, religious figures, reports from non-governmental 
organizations, and interviews with experts. I defined unofficial eye-witnesses as civilians who 
were representing an organization.  I defined political figures are current and former members of 
government or members of political parties.  I defined religious figures are people with a 
leadership role within a religion.  I defined experts as people portrayed as analysts, academics, or 
researchers in the caption below their name. A few broad patterns present themselves once the 
sources that the stations use are divided into categories. 
Generally speaking and especially with regard to their coverage of Syria, all three of the 




accounts the most heavily, and they both used them most frequently when reporting on the 
Egyptian constitutional referendum.  LBC employed civilian accounts also when relating news 
from Lebanese municipalities.   
Eye-witness accounts were used most frequently to assert the existence of multiple points 
of view to a given event.  Particularly, interviews with Egyptians were used to present the 
contested nature of the new constitution while also emphasizing the democratic process at work.  
In contrast, when LBC and MTV employed eye-witness accounts, they used them mainly to 
humanize stories of civilian suffering.  Contrastingly, al-Manar used civilian accounts in order to 
illustrate efforts by the Syrian government to ease suffering caused by armed rebel groups.  All 
three of the stations routinely edited footage of eye witnesses to an extent that the context for 
their comments was determined predominantly by the newscaster’s commentary. 
Both LBC and MTV frequently referenced Lebanese political figures in their stories on 
Syrian and international events.  The main difference between LBC and MTV’s use of Lebanese 
political figures is that MTV tended to give more time to figures that held no official government 
post, while LBC focused more on government ministers and representatives.  The only Lebanese 
figure mentioned with any regularity on al-Manar was Sayed Hussein Nasrallah. 
LBC and al-Manar frequently feature quotes from international sources.  Figures were 
commonly United Nations representatives, other nations’ foreign ministers, or civil society 
representatives.  MTV referenced relatively few international sources, but when it did, they were 
usually UN representatives.   
More than either of the other two stations, al-Manar employed experts to analyze news 
events.  These segments would usually follow a customary news story and consisted of the 




were frequently researchers from foreign institutes, political analysts, or foreign political figures.  
This format was a sharp contrast to the other nightly broadcasts, which relied on a choppier 
pastiche style of incorporating primary sources into the news. 
A last type of news source included religious figures.  Al-Manar used religious figures as 
sources with the least frequency while MTV often referenced quotes by Christian religious 
figures.  However, when covering Egypt or other Middle Eastern countries, al-Manar would 
frequently quote political figures associated with Islamist parties.  Both LBC and MTV 
employed quotes from religious leaders to frame domestic and international political problems. 
The sources that the stations relied upon had a strong influence over the ways in which 
stories were covered.  MTV’s reliance on religious figures and politicians without formal 
government positions caused most of their coverage to be slightly critical of the current 
government.  LBC’s greater reliance on politicians that held positions as ministers caused their 
coverage to be less critical of the government.  Both stations tended to emphasize the Christian 
aspects of Lebanese culture while underrepresenting Muslim aspects of it. Al-Manar’s near 
complete use of foreign sources made the Lebanese state almost invisible, and its use of experts 
tended to narrow interpretations of news stories.  Experts would often quote other sources 
presented in the story, but re-contextualized statements to an extent that made it seem like they in 
fact proved the opposite of their surface meaning.  The three stations used drastically different 
techniques for presenting the sources used in their news coverage. 
With regard to their coverage of Syria, the stations sources had a strong influence on how 
the stories were constructed.  MTV frequently framed the stories using commentary from 
Lebanese or international observers with sparing use of Syrian voices.  As a result of this use of 




when MTV covers the Lebanese government’s response to the influx of refugees, and includes 
their statements about fears that instability will spread to Lebanese society. 
In contrast, LBC and MTV tended to use more statements issued by groups within Syria.  
The two stations differed in terms of what sources they most frequently employed.  LBC 
frequently repeated statements by both opposition and regime figures, while al-Manar limited its 
quotations to official statements from Syrian figures.  Al-Manar also included statements from 
organizations that represent Syria’s civil society that frequently detailed their productive 
cooperation with the government to meet the needs of Syria citizens.  In contrast, MTV more 
frequently interviewed average citizens complaining about the depravations that they were 
suffering.  LBC frequently showed refugees who had fled to Lebanon, but al-Manar ignored the 
influx of refugees with only a few exceptions.  The three stations’ coverage of Syria was limited 
by the types of sources that they chose to use. 
Story Order 
 Looking at the stories presented and their ordering also reveals some of the divergence in 
the way the stations cover the news.  LBC tended to have the largest amount of news coverage 
that overlapped with the other two stations.  While comparing MTV and al-Manar reveals that 
MTV occasionally covers stories that al-Manar does not.  These stories usually related to 
Lebanese Christian figures.  Two examples of stories that were placed in the first position of 
MTV’s broadcast but were not covered by al-Manar are one that detailed the election of a new 
Orthodox Patriarch and another that focused on Michel Aoun talking about the need for new 
elections in Lebanon. In contrast, al-Manar frequently led its broadcasts with stories from other 




about Iraq received lots of coverage by al-Manar, but MTV dedicated significantly less time to 
these stories.  LBC usually gave its lead slot to covering Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, or local events. 
 The stations also showed diversity in position that they placed stories about Syria.  In 
general, MTV gave Syria lead positions least frequently, and stories covering Syria were often 
extremely short.  LBC, on the other hand, would frequently place Syria second in the bulletin’s 
ordering and occasionally first.  LBC’s stories on Syria were of similar length to MTV’s stories, 
but slightly longer.  Though Syria was one of al-Manar’s lead stories less frequently than on 
LBC, al-Manar always dedicated two or more stories to covering different aspects of the Syrian 
conflict.  These stories would usually be placed in succession, and would either start with an on-
the-ground view of the events periscoping out to the international community’s response or take 
the opposite approach.  Looking at the ordering of the stories in each station’s broadcast reveals 
the different priority levels that they assigned the Syrian crisis. 
Table	  2:	  Schedule	  from	  December	  16th	  broadcasts 
Story Position MTV LBC al-Manar 
1 Michel Aoun’s Stance 





2 Prime Minister Mikati Opposition to 
Egyptian constitution 
Car bomb in Karbala 
3 Election law Jala Talabani’s Health Bombing of Iranian 
Tourists in Iraq 
4 Lebanon’s President 
meets with new 
Patriarch 
Local news from 
municipalities 
Attack on Palestinian 
camp in Syria 
5 Activities of President 
Suleiman cont. 
Activities of Prime 
Minister Mikat and 
President Suleiman 






Table	  2:	  Continued	  
6 Michel Aoun Fights on college 
campus 
Damascus gives aid to 
Aleppo 
7 Hassan Nasrallah is 
responsible for 
condition of country 
Immigrants to 
Lebanon and their 
inability to access 
health care 
Egyptian constitution 
8 Tourism in Lebanon Charity foundation’s 
history  
Israeli settlements in 
Palestine 
9 Inefficient bidding 
process for public 
works project 
Economics Protests in Tunisia 
10 Egyptian protests Sports - 
11 Syrian crisis Weather - 
12 Comments by Akab 
Saqr 
- - 
13 Attacks at college in 
Lebanon 
- - 
14 Church unable to 
continue charitable 
activity due to lack of 
funds 
- - 
15 Official dinner for 
March 14th Alliance 
- - 
16 MTV wins best 
economic report 
- - 







Table	  2:	  Continued	  
19 Jala Talabani’s health - - 
20 Foreign News - - 
21 Economy - - 
22 Sports - - 
23 Weather - - 
 
 
Framing of the Syrian Crisis 
 The Syrian crisis’ complexity causes it to be open to several different interpretations and 
allows for news channels to cover it from several different angles.  Each of the stations tended to 
emphasize slightly different aspects of the crisis.  LBC and MTV used the most similar framing 
techniques, while al-Manar employed the most idiosyncratic frame. 
 MTV most frequently talked about the Syrian crisis from a humanitarian perspective.  
More specifically, it frequently covered how the Lebanese government was absorbing large 
numbers of displaced Syrians.  It focused primarily on how violent conflicts between opposition 
forces and the government had stalled the economy and destroyed infrastructure.  The crisis was 
framed as a humanitarian crisis that required international intervention to stop civilian suffering.  
The report from December 16, 2012 described the situation saying: 
ووبالعكس ووتيیرةة ددبلوماسيیة االدووليیة االبطيیئة جداا بسبة إإلى االملف االسورريیا االدمويي فوتيیرةة االمعارركك ووااالشتبكاتت سريیعة جداا 





In contrast to the very slow pace of international diplomacy with regards to the bloody 
case of Syria, the pace of the battles and clashes in Syria is very quick and results in 
dozens of deaths a day.57 
 
This characterization of the situation forefronts how the glacial pace of international politics is 
perhaps contributing to a great loss of life than would otherwise have occurred. 
 
 LBC frequently used the humanitarian angle to cover the story as well, but it dedicated 
more time to covering the repercussions of the conflict on international politics.  Specifically it 
talks about how Turkey and Iran were responding to the developing events.  It also described the 
internal working of the UN’s Security Council describing the conflict between Russia, China, 
and the United States.  LBC presented the Syrian crisis as a problem that was polarizing global 
politics in addition to threatening Lebanon’s stability. 
 Al-Manar framed the Syrian crisis as being the result of an illegitimate insurrection by 
anti-democratic rebels.  The Syrian government was presented as defending the well-being of its 
citizens while the rebels were depicted as foreign proxies meant to destabilize an anti-Western 
regime.  In its broadcast from December 16, 2012, the telecaster, Ghada al-Nimr, sums up 
Hassan Nasrallah’s take on the situation by saying: 
مع ااألسف معارركة ططويیلة في سورريیا ألنن االمعاررضة االمسلحة ووما يیقف خلفهھا من ددوولل ااألقليیميیة ترفضواا ااستمراارر االحواارر ووحمل 
يیا ووخاللل حفلة االتخرجج االسنويي لطالبب جمعيیيین قالل سيید ناصرهللا أأنما يیعتقد اانن االمعاررضة لهھم مسؤووليیة كل من يیقتل في سورر
االمسلحة قاددررةة على حاسم االمسألل عسكريیا مشتبهھ جداا مشيیراا إإلى أأنن ااالمريیكيیيین ووااالووررووبيیيین ووبعض االحكوماتت االعربيیة نصب 
 كميینا للقائدةة في سورريیا ليیقتلواا بعضهھم بعض.
 
Unfortunately, there is a long battle in Syria because the armed opposition and those 
regional and international states that stand behind it, reject continuing negotiations, and 
he [Nasrallah] assigned responsibility to them for the people being killed in Syria.  
During an annual graduation ceremony, Nasrallah said to the students that he considers it 
extremely doubtful that the armed opposition is capable of settling the matter militarily.  
He indicated that Americans, Europeans, and some Arab governments have set a trap for 
Al-Qaeda in Syria so that they would fight amongst themselves.58 
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The story is almost the complete inverse of LBC and MTV’s framing.  While LBC portrayed the 
conflict as polarizing global politics, al-Manar portrayed global schisms as tearing Syria apart. 
Integration of the Narratives 
al-Manar 
Figure	  1:	  al-­‐Manar’s	  news	  coverage	  by	  region 
  
Al-Manar’s nightly news broadcast on December 16, 2012 gave the most comprehensive 
portrayal of the Syrian crisis and its relationship to Lebanese politics.  Though its coverage’s 
distribution and format was atypical, it reveals some of the assumptions that underlie the usual 
broadcasts.  The program mainly covered a speech that Hassan Nasrallah gave at a graduation.  
The news bulletin would play clips from the speech where Nasrallah was talking about a certain 
issue, and use that to introduce a story about the issue.  Important topics received analysis from a 
guest expert. 
 This news bulletin began with Nasrallah’s view on Syria, and slowly transitioned to his 
views on local politics.  Nasrallah presented events in Syria as being the result of a Western 






al-­‐Manar's	  News	  Coverage	  December	  
16,	  2012	  
Syria	  







fighters were from outside Syria, and that local fighters were being funded by the US.  He 
asserted that the insurgency was illegitimate because it was fighting against a democratic and 
representative regime.  He further claimed that it was an attempt by the West to cause Muslims 
to fight other Muslims, and that the only parties benefitting from the conflict were the US and 
Europe. 
 The news bulletin smoothly transitions from what Nasrallah said about Syria to his 
opinion on Palestine.  Similar to his portrayal of Syria, he asserts that the events in Palestine are 
the results of foreign intervention.  It is another instance of Muslims suffering due to the actions 
of Westerners.  He emphasizes the material hardships faced by Palestinians and the lack of 
democratic processes. 
 The news bulletin then transitions to the plight of the Shi’ah in Southern Lebanon.  The 
subtle implication is that they, like the Palestinians, are suffering materially due to undemocratic 
processes and foreign intervention.  This broadcast is one of the few times that the internal 
political dynamics of Lebanon are explicitly recognized.  The link to political representation is 
then clarified when Nasrallah criticizes his Lebanese political opponents for postponing a new 
round of elections.  He claims that they are trying to cause the collapse of a legitimate governing 
force.  At this point, the subtle link between Syrian and Lebanese politics is completed.  The 
rebels in Syria are causing chaos and civilian suffering by attempting to topple a legitimate 
regime, and Nasrallah’s opponents are doing much the same.   He then calls for his followers to 
take political action.  
The progression of the news bulletin acts as a fluid argument that excites anger and 
outrage over the events in Syria and Palestine, and then, connects that outrage to concrete actions 




region’s events into one cohesive story of foreign intervention preventing the implementation of 
the people’s will. 
After finishing coverage of Nasrallah’s speech, the bulletin continues with the themes of 
democratic representation and legitimacy.  It first presents the constitutional referendum 
underway in Egypt as an instance where a corrupt regime was overthrown by an indigenous 
opposition.  It emphasizes the plurality of voices that are being aired through elections.    In 
contrast, it reintroduces the crisis in Syria, by quoting a Syrian politician who claims that the 
opposition is too divided to represent the Syrian people or take government.  The Syrian 
opposition is presented as foreign, inauthentic and unrepresentative while the Egyptian 
opposition is presented as genuine and democratic.  This point is underscored when the news 
program credits the opposition with attacking a Palestinian refugee camp.  This cycle of stories 
reinforces the identification of the Syrian opposition with the illegitimate use of force by Israeli 
forces.  The narratives constructed about Lebanese domestic politics and regional dynamics are 














Figure	  2:	  LBC’s	  news	  coverage	  by	  region 
 
  
LBC employs a similar strategy to that of al-Manar in its December 16th Broadcast, but 
attempts to assert an inverse narrative.  Like al-Manar, the program begins by covering 
Nasrallah’s speech, but he is only given a minute of airtime.  The rest of the news broadcast is 
spent refuting his claim that Syria is Western trap for al-Qaeda.  After a two-minute segment on 
the Egyptian constitution, the program begins its entry into the Syrian conflict by discussing two 
stories of Lebanese citizens who were trapped in Syria.  One story focuses on the returning of 
dead bodies while the second story focuses on the successful release of Lebanese hostages.  The 
broadcast then transitions to the attack on the Palestinian refugee camp.  Unlike al-Manar, it 
clearly places the blame on the regime’s air forces.  The broadcast then does a humanitarian 
story about how displaced Syrians and Palestinians will force tough winter conditions.   
The implication of these stories is that the events in Syria are strongly linked to events in 
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crossing the border in search of safety.  The LBC broadcast creates a clear dichotomy between 
domestic Lebanese actors and foreign Syrian actors.  The overall narrative is about the danger 
that the Syrian conflict plays to Lebanese people and society. 
The narrative continues by covering the Egyptian election a second time.  Similar to the 
al-Manar program, this juxtaposition makes a clear contrast, of a successful Arab Spring with 
what some of deemed the Syrian Winter.  The LBC sets up this dynamic by talking about the 
winter conditions that displaced Syrian will face.  It further reinforces this by showing how the 
Egyptians are now able to express themselves through using the vote.  The need to protect 
Lebanese politics from the threat of Syria is reinforced by the subsequent story that covers the 
Maronite Patriarch saying that it is a shame that Lebanese elections should not be delayed due to 
instability in Syria.  This is a powerful contrast between the Egyptian going to the election booth, 
displaced Syrians fleeing to Lebanon, and Lebanese citizens being prevented from voting.  The 
Lebanese identity is further reinforced by the next story, which covers Sami Jumayyil 
complaining about the exclusion of a Lebanese resistance movement from history books.  These 
stories when taken together imply that in order to protect its democratic system Lebanon needs 












Figure	  3:	  MTV’s	  news	  coverage	  by	  region 
 
 The broadcast that most exemplifies MTV narrative about Syria was broadcast on 
December 17, 2012.  The MTV narrative is far more parochial.  It begins with a story on 
politicians in Jabria who are afraid of leaving their houses because of sectarian violence.  The 
broadcast then transitions to sectarian violence in Syria.  Next the program covers the refugee 
influx to Lebanon.  It concludes with the Maronite Patriarch accepting a delegation from Syria. 
 This sequence of stories reveals the significance that the Syrian crisis has within 
Lebanese politics.  Similar to MTV there is a palpable fear that instability abroad will lead to 
instability at home.  MTV specifically implies that events in Syria may lead to an increase in 
sectarian violence in Lebanon.  To some extent it effaces the distinction between Syrian and 
Lebanese identities by concluding with a story of cooperation between Lebanese and Syrian 
officials.  The story, however, still takes a very sectarian take on relations within the two 
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 From analyzing the content and strategies used in presenting the nightly broadcasts, it can 
be seen that these three television stations present starkly different views of the relationship 
between the Syrian crisis and Lebanese politics.  MTV focuses on the Lebanese side of the story 
and the implications that the conflict has on Lebanon.  In contrast, al-Manar practically ignores 
Lebanon as a political entity focusing more regional attitudes and responses.  LBC takes a more 
mixed approach, balancing between domestic Lebanese issues, Syrian problems, and the 
international community.  Interestingly, all three channels emphasize the importance of 


















Chapter 3: Syria in Lebanese Print Media 
This chapter discusses the framing of the Syrian conflict in two of Lebanon’s leading 
print journals.  It consists of a general overview of how Syria was covered, and then proceeds to 
content analysis in order to reveal the specific linguistic characteristics used in portrayals of the 
conflict’s main actors.  This chapter aims to compare how actors are described by two different 
journals and also how these descriptions change over time.  First, the methods used to analyze 
the articles are described.  Then, a description of the frames initially used by the two periodicals 
in their coverage of Syria is presented.  Next, portrayals of the Syrian conflicts main actors are 
described to show how they reinforce the story’s framing.  Lastly, a description of how these 
portrayals changed over time is presented.  The main conclusion is that though the two 
periodicals began in January with contrasting writing styles, by the beginning of February, the 
language used in their articles on Syria became remarkably similar. 
Framing 
 Al-Mustaqbal and as-Safir used very different frames when covering the Syrian crisis. Al-
Mustaqbal tended to present the conflict as being a chaotic human rights crisis.  There was a 
strong emphasis placed on the negative effects that the crisis was having on Lebanese politics.  
In contrast, as-Safir tended to frame the situation as a conflict between the Assad regime and 
rebel forces.  A large number of its articles focused on the question of whether or not there could 
be a political solution to the crisis. 
 The vast majority of al-Mustaqbal’s stories on Syria focused on the plight of Syrian 
refugees that have fled to Lebanon.  The stories describe the troubling conditions in Syria that 
led to their exodus, and then continue to describe the refugees’ continuing hardship in Lebanon 




frequently focus on the challenge that events in Syria posed towards Lebanese politics.  Political 
stagnation in Lebanon was blamed on polarization that was seen as resulting from the Syrian 
crisis.  The articles that did focus on the internal dynamics of the conflict in Syria usually came 
from the Associated Press, and portrayed it as an asymmetrical fight between Assad’s regime 
and rebel forces.  One story, which was accompanied by a particularly graphic picture of charred 
corpses, opened with a line describing the violence Syria by saying: 
االف ررووحح تأكيید ااالمم االمتحدةة أأمس, ووددعع ااألسد  60بالمجاززرر ووااالشالء وواالجثث االمترااميیة على مساحة سورريیا حاصدةة ااكثر من 
للوقودد قربب  شهھيیداا في قصف بالطيیراانن االحربي أأمس على محطة 120بمحرقة أأووددتت أأكثر من 2013, ليیستقبل االعامم 2012االعامم 
 ددمشق.
The UN confirmed yesterday that more than 60 thousand human lives were lost in 
massacres and carnage; their bodies are littered across the Syrian landscape.  Al-Assad 
said goodbye to 2012 and welcomed 2013 with mass carnage that claimed the lives of 
more than 120 victims in air bombing that hit a gas station near Damascus.59 
 
As the opening to the article, this paragraph cues the reader to perceive Assad as ruthlessly 
killing his on people.  Notably, a sectarian frame was hardly ever emphasized in the articles. 
 As-Safir portrayed the conflict in starkly different terms.  Its articles deemphasize the 
conflict’s death toll and the refugee crisis, and they emphasize the potential for a political 
solution.  Similarly, when refugees are mentioned the problem is framed as how to best facilitate 
their return.  Unlike al-Mustaqbal, there is no direct link made between the Syrian crisis and 
problems within Lebanon.  More so than in al-Mustaqbal’s articles, the Syrian conflict and its 
resolution is linked to foreign intervention.  An article from January 1st states: 
ووهھھھي بيین ااحتمالي تدهھھھورر ااألووضاعع ااألمنيیة وواالمعيیشيیة ووبيین ااحتماالتت تسويیة سيیاسيیة, تعمل من ااجلهھا  2013تدخل سورريیا لعامم 
ذرر من أأنن غيیابب االحل االسيیاسي موسكو ووووااشنطن وواالمبعوثث االدوولي وواالعبربي إإلى سورريیا ااألخضر ااإلبرااهھھھيیمي االذيي كانن ح
 سيیؤدديي إإلى "اانهھيیارر االدوولة االسورريیة...
 
Syria entered 2013 with the twin possibilities of either further degradation in its living 
and security situation and or a political resolution.  Moscow, Washington, and the UN’s 
special envoy to Syria, al-Akhdar al-Ibrahimi, are working towards just such an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




agreement.  Ibrahimi warned that the absence of a political solution will lead to the 
collapse of the Syrian state.60 
 
This description of the conflict emphasizes the role that foreigners are playing to resolve the 
conflict, and allows for the newspaper to avoid focusing on the conflicts death toll.  International 
actors are often presented as preventing a Syrian solution to the conflict.  Competition between 
Israel and Iran is presented as exacerbating the situation, while the power politics of Russia and 
the United States are seen as offering unrealistic solutions to the conflict and simultaneously 
providing the Assad regime and the opposition forces with the means to continue fighting. 
Portrayals of Key Actors 
The Regime 
 In general, al-Mustaqbal presents the Syrian regime as an aggressive actor.  The regime 
is most often presented as bombing civilians during air raids and failing to provide citizens with 
basic necessities.  The regime is also portrayed as exporting terrorism and instability to Lebanon.  
The opening sentence to one article from January 4 states: 
يیبدوو أأنن االنظامم االسورريي االذيي يیدمر سورريیا فوقق ررؤؤووسس أأهھھھلهھا وواالذيي لم يیوفر شخصيیة مثل ميیشالل سماحة الستخدمهھا في 
تخداامهھا ووسيیلة لتمريیر مخططاتت مخططاتهھ ااالررهھھھابيیة تحاهه لبنانن, لم يیوفر ااآلنن مأساةة االناززحيین االهھارربيیيین من بطشة ووإإجراامهھ الس
 ااررهھھھابيیة ووااجرااميیة جديیدةة في لبنانن.
 
It seems that the Syrian regime which is causing Syria to collapse on the heads of its 
people, and which offered up a character like Michel Samaha in order to use him in its 
terrorist plans towards Lebanon, and is now creating the crisis of these refugees fleeing 
its violent offenses, in order to expand its new terrorist and criminal plans in Lebanon.61 
 
This sentence delegitimizes the Syrian regime from the outset.  It also gives current accusations 
that Syria is sending terrorists to Lebanon disguised as refugees added salience by referencing 
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Michel Samaha who was a Lebanese government official that was convicted of committing acts 
of terror on Syria’s behalf. 
 Most articles offer less direct criticisms of the Assad regime.  The typical method was to 
mention civilian deaths in close association with bombing attacks by regime airplanes.  
Interestingly, “Assad” is used as an adjective to describe regime forces or figures in some 
articles.  Most of these articles also use “regime” and “Syrian” to describe these same figures, 
but a general trend is that “Assad” is used as an adjective when particularly offensive or violent 
acts are being committed.  One example is in a story about the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, he 
is referred to as “Assad’s Ambassador” when he is making claims that seem implausible.  This 
moniker is used when he claims that Syria is becoming safe enough for refugees to begin 
returning to their homes.  Though no language in the article directly contradicts this claim, the 
article is positioned on the news page so that it is surrounded on three sides by an article where 
the second sentence accuses Assad of committing massacres. 
In addition to being used as a term that delegitimizes the person or group to which it is 
assigned, the name Assad is also strongly linked to inhumane acts of violence.  The article 
mentioned in the above section on framing that discusses charred corpses is entitled “Mahraqa 
Assadiyah fi Damashq” (Assad’s Burnt Sacrifice/Incinerator in Damascus)62.   When fighting 
forces are mentioned, they are usually described as “regime forces” when they are engaging in 
combat with opposition groups.  In contrast, they are referred to as “Assad’s forces” when they 
are committing violent acts against citizens.  The Shabiha, the Ba’ath Party’s plain-clothes 
intimidation force, is always described as belonging to Assad.  Notably, the regime is never 
described as being Alawite. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Articles in al-Mustaqbal most frequently describe the regime as being an illegitimate 
aggressor in the Syrian conflict.  It is portrayed as committing massacres, driving refugees out of 
the country, and ignoring the suffering of the Syrians who remain inside the country.  An 
interesting aspect of word choice is that particularly horrific acts were linked directly to Assad 
while less illegitimate uses of force were linked to the Syrian regime. 
As-Safir paints a more positive picture of President Assad and his regime.  In general, 
Assad is portrayed as desiring a political solution to the crisis and as having to deal with an 
opposition that refuses to negotiate. The paper quotes Assad in an article from January 9 as 
saying: 
اانسانيیا ووااجتمعايیا ووخاصة لجهھة إإعطاء أأوولويیة  اانهھ ال بد ووقبل اايیة تسويیة, من ووقف أأعمالل االعنف ووإإررااحة االسورريیيین
لعوددةة االناززحيین ووإإغاثتهھم ووتلبيیة حاجتهھم "وونحن من جهھتنا مستعدوونن لاللتزاامم بوقف االنارر, لكن االسؤااتت من هھھھي االجهھة االدووليیة 
 االتي ستضمن ووقف أأعمالل االعنف من قبل االجانب ااآلخر.
 
It is necessary to accept any agreement that stops the acts of violence, and provides for 
the  humanitarian and societal comfort of Syrians, especially giving priority to the return 
of the displaced with regards to relivieving their suffering and satisfying their needs. 
“We, on our part, are ready to impose a cease-fire, but the question is who from the 
international community will ensure that the other side maintains the cease-fire.63 
 
Allowing Assad to speak on his own behalf enables him to present himself as being primarily 
concerned with the safety of his people as opposed to the safety of his regime.  Positive 
portrayals of the regime are tempered by figures taken from the Syrian Human Rights Watch 
describing civilian deaths caused by his regime’s air raids. As-Safir also complicates its portrayal 
of the Syrian regime by including quotations from a variety of critical international figures.  One 
article quotes Egypt’s President describing the situation in Syria as a “blood bath.”  The same 
article quotes the French foreign minister as well as the US’ State Department condemning 
President Assad for the acts he has committed against his citizens. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Despite the inclusion of opposing portrayals of the Syrian regime, as-Safir’s portrayal of 
the regime tends to be positive.  Its articles’ first paragraphs usually quote regime officials’ 
descriptions of events.  Negative descriptions of the regime tend to come at the very end of 
articles or in the articles continuation several pages inside the periodical. 
The Opposition 
 Representations of the Syrian opposition forces in al-Mustaqbal tend to be complex and 
inconsistent.  Articles mention various components of the opposition without explaining what 
differentiates them.  Articles switch between describing actions by the Free Syrian Army and the 
Al-Nusra Front.  They also use a variety of words to describe the opposition’s armed forces.    
The most common phrase is “opposition fighters,” but other terms include “revolutionaries” and 
“opposition armed forces.” 
 The opposition is generally portrayed as the conflict’s protagonists.  Though al-
Mustaqbal does not support them directly, its articles imply that their cause is more legitimate 
than the Syrian regime’s.  One way this is accomplished is through describing the civilian 
casualties caused by the regime’s air raids, and describing rebel attempts to gain control of air 
fields immediately afterwards.   One such instance is an article that appeared January 3.  In one 
paragraph, it describes Assad’s forces as engaging in vicious attacks on Damascus’ suburbs with 
the aim of demoralizing the Opposition.  The very next sentence describes the opposition fighters 
saying: 
ااشتباكاتت عنيیفة بيین االقوااتت االنطاميیة وومقاتليین من جبهھة االنصرةة ووكتائب ااحراارر االشامم ووفي محافظة ااددلب (شمالل غربب), ددااررتت 
وواالطليیعة ااالسالميیة االذيین ااقتحمواا مطارر تفتنازز االعسكريي ووااستولواا عليیهھ حسب فضائيیة االعربيیة نقلت عن ااتحادد االتنسقيیاتت االثوررةة 
 االسورريیة.
 
In Idlib (Northwest), there were violent clashes between regime forces and fighters from 




Military Airport and took control of according to a report from the satellite station al-
Arabiyah released by the union for coordination of the Syrian Revolution.64   
 
The implication is that the opposition is fighting to end the regime’s indiscriminate attacks on its 
people. The article also gives the impression that despite the diversity of groups involved in fight 
the regime, they do so with a high degree of coordination. 
The infractions that some opposition groups have committed against civilians are rarely 
mentioned, and opposition groups’ negative attributes are not described in detail.   Interestingly, 
when the al-Nusra Front is mentioned, articles rarely discuss allegations that it is associated with 
al-Qaeda.  The only time opposition groups are linked to civilian suffering is when civilian 
casualties are discussed in the context of clashes between regime and opposition forces.  In 
contrast when describing the same opposition attack on the airport in an article from January 4, 
as-Safir describes the opposition saying: 
مطارر تنفتازز االعسكريي في رريیف ووااستطاعت االقوااتت االسورريیة صد هھھھجومم ضخم شنهھ مئاتت االمسلحيیيین ااالسالميیيین على 
 ااددلب...
 
The Syrian forces were able to repel a huge attack by armed Islamist on the Tinftaz 
Military Airport in the suburbs of Idlib…65 
 
This is one of the few times that either periodical used the word “Islamists.”  It is also interesting 
that the illegitimacy and foreigness of the Islamists is reinforced by referring to Assad’s forces as 
“the Syrian forces.” 
Articles in as-Safir also portray the opposition as being disorganized, but often these 
portrayals present the opposition as being responsible for causing the crisis.  In many of the 
articles, they are presented as acting outside of Syria’s established institutions and preventing the 
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regime from negotiating with legitimate representatives of the Syrian people.  One article 
published on January 1 quotes the Russian Foreign Minister as saying: 
مم" أأوو قوىى االنظامم إإلى ...نجاحح االمعرضة االمسلحة لن لن يینهھي االمشكلة, بل رربما يینقلهھا إإلى ططابع آآخر. فيیتحولل "االنظا
 االمعاررضة االمسلحة. كما يیحذرر من خطر االتقسيیم.
 
…The success of the armed opposition will not end the problem.  Rather it could move it 
to a different level.  It could convert the “regime” or the regime’s forces into the armed 
opposition.  It also poses the threat of division.66  
 
This quote is meant to support the idea that the only possible solution to crisis is a political 
agreement between the regime and the opposition.  It suggests that the opposition will be 
incapable of uniting the country if it defeats the regime, but maintains a more agnostic stance 
than al-Mustaqbal as to which party possesses greater legitimacy.  
Coverage of the opposition in as-Safir gives them a less central role than al-Mustaqbal’s 
coverage does.  Though the two news sources generally use similar terms, the terms that do not 
overlap are indicative of the periodicals’ differing orientations.  This is most noticeable with al-
Mustaqbal’s occasional use of the word “thuwar” or “revolutionaries” whereas as-Safir would 
occasionally use the term “Munshaquun” “dissidents” or “separatists.”  Though a minor 
difference, al-Mustaqbal’s use of the term revolutionaries lends legitimacy to the fighters while 
the root of the term used by as-Safir denotes breaking apart, segregating, or being troublesome.   
In as-Safir, the Syrian regime and international actors play more central roles than does the 
opposition.   
Refugees 
 Al-Mustaqbal focuses a great deal on the plight of refugees.  Most stories focus either on 
the conditions that are causing refugees to flee their homes or focus on the continued challenges 
that they face once they take up residence in refugee camps.  When the refugees are not referred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




to as victims of a humanitarian crisis, they are presented as bringing violence and instability to 
Lebanon.   Numerous articles focused on conflicts breaking out within refugee camps between 
groups representing different Syrian factions.  One article claims that members of Bashar al-
Assad’s Shabiha, a security force known for its cruelty, was purposely infiltrating refugee camps 
in order to promote instability.  Another common point of discussion is the idea that arguments 
over the Lebanese government’s policy towards Lebanese refugees were causing the Lebanese 
political system to stall. 
 Refugees play a relatively unimportant role in as-Safir’s articles.  The Syrian crisis is 
presented as being primarily an internal problem.  When refugees are mentioned it was within 
the context of restoring stability within Syria so that they could return to their homes.  An article 
on a speech by Nasrallah is the only time that the refugees play a central role in an article’s 
subject matter.  It is also the only time that an explicit link was made between the Syrian crisis 
and internal Lebanese political conflicts.   
 Corresponding to as-Safir’s stronger focus on the crisis as internal problem, articles in the 
journal tend to mention the Syrian people significantly more than al-Mustaqbal.  Specifically the 
word “sha’b” is used more frequently, which is a word that invokes more of sense of nationhood 
than does the term Syrians.  In as-Safir, President al-Assad is portrayed as protecting the rights 
of the Syrian people which seems to address the rallying cry of other revolts in Arab countries, 
which have used a slogan which placed the regime in contradistinction to the people.  As-Safir 
more so than al-Mustaqbal sets the Syrian people as a group with different interests from the 
Syrian opposition groups.  In al-Mustaqbal Syrians are either refugees, members of the 
opposition, or regime loyalists.  In contrast, as-Safir portrays the majority of Syrians as being 




 An interesting note about word choice is that both papers used the word “Nazih” to refer 
to Syrians who have fled their homes as opposed to the term ”laaja,’” which is more commonly 
used to refer to refugees.  “Nazih” has become associated with the English term “displaced 
person,” but its root meaning is more closely related to “emigrant” or a person who has travelled 
away from their home.  Both papers do use “laaja’” in a couple of instances, but it is not clear 
why the switched occurs.  It is worth noting that both articles that use the term “laaja’” are 
translations from the Associated Press. 
The International Community 
 The international community is portrayed quite differently in the two papers.  Al-
Mustaqbal mainly described international efforts to help refugees that were fleeing to Syria’s 
neighboring countries.  Also, quotations from United Nations’ officials and other diplomats are 
used as a way to voice criticism for the actions of the Syrian government.  The most frequently 
cited actors are Human Rights Watch, the UN, France, the US, and Iran.  Iran, China, and Russia 
are presented as supporting the regime and enabling it to continue despite ostracism from other 
international actors.  The UN’s Security Council is frequently mentioned as being unable to 
respond to the crisis in an effective manner.  Most Arab countries are presented as being 
supportive of the opposition.  The President of Egypt, Mohammad Morsi, is the Arab figure with 
quotations that most strongly criticize the regime. 
 In general, al-Mustaqbal does not report on the opinions that Lebanese politicians have 
on the events inside Syria.  The journal mainly deals with their views on how to handle the flood 
of refugees that is straining Lebanon’s resources.  Other criticisms include the idea that the 




 One news story that departs from typical non-sectarian coverage of Lebanese politicians’ 
views on the Syrian crisis is a section of a news article about statements that Hasan Nasrallah 
made about Lebanese citizens that had been abducted in Syria.  Nasrallah made a statement 
implying that Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries could play a more proactive role in 
encouraging the Syrians responsible for abductions to release their captives.  In response to this 
statement, Okab Sakr, a Shi’i politician that belongs to the 14 March Movement, said that al-
Assad was trying to cause sectarian conflict in Lebanon by using Lebanese proxies.  He then 
used an Arabic expression, “raising the shirt of Othman,” which invokes a dispute that helped 
generate the original split between Sunnis and Shiites.  This particular saying implies that the 
person it is directed against is rallying people to a cause by inciting anger over an injustice for 
which the speaker feels no sincere outrage.  Sakr’s response seems like a veiled attack on 
Nasrallah that questions the authenticity of his concern for the kidnapped Lebanese.  It is also a 
coded challenge to Nasrallah’s status as a loyal Shi’i. 
As-Safir shows a much stronger concern for the international aspect to the Syrian crisis.  
Many of the articles focus on how the posturing of regional powers determines the course of 
events in Syria.  The primary international actors are Iran, Israel, the US, and Russia.  Israel is 
presented as meddling in Syrian affairs in order to protect is geo-strategic interests.  The United 
States is presented as an ally to Israel that basis its foreign policy on oil interests and Israel’s 
security.  Iran is presented as providing the regime with large amounts of financial and military 
aid, while Russia is presented as offering Syria political and financial support that is contingent 
on it not hindering its more important geostrategic positions.   
The most surprising aspect of analyzing how these articles cover international actors is 




analyzing the situation in Syria.  Though some of the articles in as-Safir mention Israeli hopes 
for a faltering “Access of Evil,” most articles avoid describing Syria and Iran’s alliance as being 
motivated by religion.  The only other notable exception to the non-sectarian nature of the 
coverage is an article in al-Mustaqbal, which indicates that some politicians were concerned that 
refugees were receiving different treatment depending on their religious and political 
backgrounds.  
Changes in the Coverage over Time 
 After an Islamic summit that was held in Cairo on February 4, 2013, there was a 
noticeable shift in how both journals cover the Syrian crisis.  The most surprising aspect of this 
shift is that the two periodicals seemed to converge in how they covered Syria.  Notably, it is not 
the case that one journal maintained its original coverage while the other began conforming to a 
new narrative.  Both papers made slight alterations to their coverage that resulted in their articles 
becoming more similar. 
 Specifically, al-Mustaqbal reduced the frequency with which stories on its front page 
emphasized the humanitarian crisis or the large number of refugees.  It began emphasizing the 
potential for a political agreement that would lead to the regime’s abdication of power.  For its 
part, as-Safir stopped its positive coverage of the Assad regime.  It also began to treat the 
opposition as though it were the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.  It increasingly 
used the word “revolution” to refer to fighting in Syria and the word “revolutionaries” to 
describe opposition fighters.  Another interesting point of convergence between the periodicals’ 
coverage is that al-Mustaqbal began to increasingly use the phrase “al-sha’b al-suri” (the Syrian 
people).  In this way, both periodicals began to speak of the rights of the Syrian people using the 




representative of the Syrian people.  This increase in al-Mustaqbal’s references to the Syrian 
people also coincided with a reduction in the number of times the paper referenced Syrian 
refugees. 
 The main aspects of the newspapers coverage that remained the same were that al-
Mustaqbal continued to portray Iran as supporting an illegitimate regime and as-Safir continued 
to show a stronger emphasis on the role of the international community in determining the course 
of events in Syria.  All of the front-page stories about Syria that appeared in as-Safir focused on 
the positions that foreign powers were taking with regards to how the crisis could be settled.  As-
Safir continued to emphasize the importance of a resolution to the crisis determined by the 
Syrian people, but it and al-Mustaqbal began to use the phrase “a peaceful departure” when 
referring to the Assad regime’s ultimate fate.  Though coverage in the papers continued to 
maintain some slight differences, the degree to which their coverage began to converge after the 
Islamic summit was considerable. 
Conclusion 
 Al-Mustaqbal and as-Safir began January with markedly different coverage of the Syrian 
crisis, but by the beginning of February their stories used remarkably similar language to 
describe the crisis, its actors, and potential solutions.  The nature of this change is reminiscent to 
a similar phenomenon that John Noakes and Karin Wilkins identified with regard to American 
media coverage of the first Palestinian Intifadah.  In their article they noted that as the 
Palestinian resistance changed its tactics to ones that were accepted by Western media sources, 
they received greater and more sympathetic coverage.67  Similarly, the Syrian Opposition 
announced that it was willing to enter into negotiations with the Syrian regime during the Islamic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Summit.  This was a complete reversal of its previous stances that rejected negotiation.  As 
international efforts began to focus on achieving a political solution to the crisis and recognizing 
the opposition’s legitimacy so too did media coverage of the crisis and the opposition.  The 
changed tactics of the opposition resulted in their movement receiving more favorable coverage, 
but it also resulted in Iran and the Syrian regime receiving less favorable coverage from as-Safir. 
 This study suggests that the way a periodical covers various international actors is not 
predetermined by its political orientation, and that they are sensitive to changes in the political 
stances of actors.  Interestingly in an article published by as-Safir in March, the opposition was 
no longer portrayed as being legitimate.  Also, the sectarian tone of the article was much sharper 
than in the time periods that this article took under consideration.  The article asserted that a 
large number of the fighters in Syria were Tunisian youth funded by Saudi Arabia and trained in 
Libya as part of Sunni conspiracy to remove a Shiite regime.  Looking at coverage of the Syrian 
crisis in these two papers reveals that narratives in the media are dynamic and at times, internally 
















Chapter 4: Political Conflict in Lebanese Media in 1978 
 
 This chapter adds global and historical contexts to understanding how Lebanese media 
cover the civil unrest in Syria that starting in 2011. In assessing the significance of the Arab 
Spring, journalists have already called it a turning point in world history and, more specifically, 
the history of social movements68.  In order to better understand contemporary coverage of the 
Syrian conflict, I compare how a Lebanese periodical covered the Iranian revolution to its 
coverage in Israeli and Iraqi periodicals.  I include comparisons of other events happening during 
the same time frame.  This comparison reveals how the geopolitical position of a country as well 
as its internal politics can affect the language its media uses to cover world events.  The chapter 
provides a temporal point of contrast that elucidates the effects of Lebanon’s intimate political 
relationship with Syria on media coverage.      
This chapter studies coverage of a pivot point in Iran’s civil unrest, which foreshadowed 
the coming revolution.  The pivot point is a 1978 government crackdown on student protests that 
became known as Black Friday. 69 The event’s ominous moniker, which appeared in the news 
less than two weeks after it occurred, is indicative of the significance it held at that time and the 
significance it continues to hold today.  Similarly to the current crisis in Syria, international 
observers were unsure of the exact nature of the protests that were taking shape in Iran 1978.  
They had no idea about what type of regime would replace the Shah’s repressive reign. 
I first examine the portrayals of the events surrounding Black Friday in two of the three 
regional newspapers examined in order to provide a context for understanding how the events 
were nominally perceived at the time.  This section takes into consideration the news spanning 
from September 5th, 1978 through September 13th, 1978.  Next, the chapter analyzes how four 
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other historically significant and contemporaneous events were covered by the same newspapers 
in order reveal the impact of geopolitics on the narrative frames that are used to interpret news 
events.  The four events analyzed are the Camp David negotiations, the revolt in Rhodesia, the 
Revolution in Nicaragua, and violence in Lebanon.  Finally, I place all of the portrayals in dialog 
not only with each other, but also with current understandings of the event’s significance.  This 
contextualization reveals how the Lebanese periodical’s coverage compared to coverage of civil 
unrest in the print media of other countries in the region, and also shows the significant role that 
Syria plays in Lebanese media’s discourse.   
The chapter concludes that the portrayal of international events in media designed for 
domestic consumption is a delicate balance between a media institution’s stated or unstated 
interests and the articulated or unarticulated ontological frameworks that its journalist use in 
understanding the world.  More pointedly stated, a media outlet, due to its geopolitical position, 
has a limited number of narrative frames at its disposal, and these frames will limit how it covers 
a story.  The greater the challenge an event poses to the institution’s interests or ontological 
framework, the more restrictive its frames become.  Extreme challenges may result in frames so 
restrictive that they generate hyperbolic and cartoonish portrayals or, ironically, the reverse may 
occur: perplexingly sterile descriptions of harrowing events.  This chapter found that events as 
politically, religiously, and socially charged as those of September 1978 inspired both types of 
extreme responses. It suggests that similar processes may be underway in the Lebanese media’s 








The Black Friday Narrative in the Baghdad Observer 
In the days preceding the arrival of the Japanese Prime Minister to Iran on September 5th, 
1978, 15 people died in the 5-day long protests that occurred in Tehran, Qom, and Khorram, and 
Abadan.  The demonstrators were reported to have smashed windows.7071  The Iranian national 
radio station claims that the casualties in Tehran were two policemen and two protestors. If the 
entire month of Ramadan is taken into consideration, then 37 people died in violent clashes. 
 On September 7, the government issued a ban on public gatherings because “urban 
guerillas” had attacked a security base armed with machine guns, killing one guard.  The 
assailants also spread leaflets promising to kill all policemen.72 The ban came just one day before 
a planned demonstration to commemorate the deaths of people in previous weeks’ 
demonstrations where over 100,000 people participated.  Opposition leaders and shop-keepers in 
Tehran Bazaar call for strikes.73 
 On September 8, over 100,000 peaceful demonstrators gathered in Tehran calling for 
political freedom.  The bazaris organize general strikes in honor of 37 protestors who died in 
previous weeks.  Other cities and towns organize smaller rallies.  Despite protests, the Shah is 
expected to go on with his trip to Eastern Europe.74 
 Apparently, more than 58 people died and 208 were injured in clashes in Tehran on 
September 8th.  Automatic weapons were fired on protestors, some of whom were women, for 
refusing to disperse.  Martial law has been imposed in 11 cities.  As a result of the disturbances, 
the Japanese Prime Minister’s dinner was interrupted.75 
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 On Sunday, September 10, Opposition leaders walked out of parliamentary meeting in 
protest of Jafar Sherif Emami’s, the newly installed prime minister, program.  Led by Mohsen 
Pezeshgour, opposition leaders shouted anti-government slogans as they exited the building. 
Sporadic flare ups of violence seemed likely as bazaris continue to shut their stores.7677  The 
Iranian government targets opposition leaders in a series of jailings.  Bazaris continue to close 
shops for a fourth day.78 
 Tehran seemed to be enjoying a tense calm.  The government arrests several more 
ministers including former health minister.  Bazaris continue with shop closures.  The 
government claims that only 97 were killed and 205 wounded during demonstrations, but the 
opposition claims that nearly 3,000 died in clashes.  Political and religious figures call for day of 
mourning. 
 
The Black Friday Narrative in An-Nahar 
 On September 4, over a thousand people protested for the return of Ayatollah Khomeini, 
offering flowers to soldiers.  Religious officials banned participants from committing acts of 
violence.  Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari rejects negotiations with the government 
until free elections are held.  Karim Sanjabi, a liberal opposition leader, said he might not be 
opposed to working with communists if they agreed to cut their ties with foreign countries.798081 
 Protest movements are the product of over 8 months of work by religious opposition 
leaders to show that foreign communities do not control Iranian streets.  Prime Minister Jafar 
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Sharif Emami calls for Muslims to return to the correct path, and says that he is constant contact 
with religious leaders.82 
 On September 8th, over 100,000 peaceful protesters gathered in Tehran in memory of 
protestors who died during the protests on Eid.  Some demonstrators wanted Ayatollah Khomeini 
to be allowed to return from exile.  Foreign diplomats and moderate Iranian observers claim that 
the Shah’s regime is not in real danger.  Khomeini claims that the gatherings are evidence that 
the people want the Shah to leave.83 
 Over 250 people died in clashes between military and opposition supporter in what is 
beginning to look like a real revolution.8485  Religious leaders defied the Shah’s ban in order to 
call for the return of Khomeini.  The government began to arrest lawyers and politicians believed 
to be associated with the protests.  The Soviets claimed that the United States is supporting the 
Shah in order to protect their access to Iranian oil.86 
Security forces searched the home of Karim Sanjabi and the home of the president of the 
Commission for Protecting Human Rights.  Both men feared arrest. Abba Huweida resigned post 
as head of Imperial Court for undisclosed reasons. 
 On September 10, martial law was declared in 11 cities, and rumors circulate that it was 
Israelis who were responsible for firing the first shots which ended the peaceful protests on 
Friday September 8th.  
 On September 11th, the regime began arresting former political representatives in an 
attempt to quell public resentment.  A large number of businessmen were also banned from 
leaving the country. Shaykh Yahya Al-Noori becomes the most prominent religious figure to be 
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arrested by the Shah’s regime. Some opposition leaders said that there could be no more 
compromise with the government.87 
 
A Brief Comparison of Narratives 
 Perhaps the most striking feature of the Baghdad Observer’s narrative is that it never 
mentions Ayatollah Khomeini at all and rarely mentions the Shah. The only time the Shah is 
mentioned is in the context of the Japanese Prime Minister or in regards to the Shah’s travel 
plans.88  Rather, it focuses on government actors and the moderate and radical opposition 
movements.  The paper rarely mentions the religious aspect of the demonstrations.  In contrast, 
An-Nahar focuses on the religious aspects of the social movement almost reductively.  The 
opposition is almost always called the religious opposition, and its leaders are almost always 
referred to as the religious opposition leaders.  All distinctive aspects of the demonstrations, from 
the peaceful processions to the closing of the Tehran bazaar, are attributed to the religious 
leadership’s decisions.  The Baghdad Observer was the only journal to give a leadership role and 
agency to the bazaar class. 
 The Jerusalem Post’s coverage was somewhat similar to An-Nahar’s because they both 
used a significant number of articles from the Associated Press and Reuters.  Despite this shared 
content, the narratives they presented had some important distinctions.  The Jerusalem Post 
tended to highlight the anti-imperial aspects of the opposition movement and Khomeini’s 
statements.89  There was also more of an effort to contextualize the factors that contributed to the 
foment as it became increasingly apparent that the events were escalating.90 The Iraqi paper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87		أأعمالل  	ووررجالل  	سابقيینن  	مسؤؤووليینن  	باعتقالل  	االنقمة  	اامتصتصص  	تحوولل  	االسلططاتت)    1978)	  
88	  (Reuter	  1978)	  
89	  (Krimsky	  1978)	  




avoided handling the religious aspect of the movement while the Lebanese and Israeli journals 
downplayed the role of the bazaar class and emphasized the role of religious leaders, naming 
many of them. The potential reasons for this disparity will be explored after discussing the 
differences in coverage found with four other events.  
 
The Camp David Negotiations 
All three of the papers discussed in the paper dedicated large amounts of space to the three-way 
negotiations between Presidents Anwar El Sadat and Jimmy Carter and Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin.  Judging by depth and consistency, clearly this was perceived as the most 
significant event of the time period covered, but each journal covered the issue from a slightly 
different standpoint.  These differences in coverage reveal more about the country’s domestic 
politics than actual factual inconsistencies.  In fact, all of the newspapers tended to agree on the 
hard facts; the difference is in their framing and the interpretation.   
 The paper with the clearest perspective was the Baghdad Observer.  It consistently 
criticized all of the participants in the negotiations, and framed the issue as a betrayal of the Arab 
cause.  It portrayed President Carter as being an Israeli partisan who was working to make sure 
Egypt made all the concessions while Israelis would receive all of its demands.91  In contrast, The 
Jerusalem Post insisted that Carter was pushing for both sides to make difficult compromises.92 
The Baghdad Observer depicts President Sadat as betraying the Arab nation, and in particular, 
the Palestinians.93 He is also accused of corruption and stealing from the Egyptian people.94  One 
particular ad imitates a “wanted” flyer for a criminal and places him next to Prime Minister 
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Begin, who is accused of committing the massacre at Deir Yasin.  The paper never uses the word 
Israeli, but rather prefers the term “Zionist”95.  To further impugn Sadat the periodical portrays 
him as a leader who can neither feed his poor country nor maintain their support.9697  In contrast, 
the Iraqi government is presented in a positive light, and the page opposite the article on Egypt’s 
economic strife is replete with articles touting Iraq’s economic development programs, which are 
centered around coordination with other Arab states.9899  The Baghdad Observer blatantly 
attempts to question Egypt’s claim to be the leader of Arabism, and attempts to establish itself as 
the true occupier of that role.100101  
 The paper with the next most-apparent perspective is The Jerusalem Post, which presents 
the talks in an unequivocally positive light.  The paper rarely goes into much detail about what 
the potential consequences of the negotiations are, but frequently talks about the benefits of 
normalizing relations with Egypt.102  Wolf Blitzer goes out of his way to extend platitudes to the 
Egyptian president complimenting him on everything from his healthy jaunt to his “handsome” 
pinstripe suit.103  All of the headlines about the negotiations involve positive adjectives such as 
“warm,” “cordial,” or “friendly”. The Egyptian people, however, are portrayed as one of Sadat’s 
biggest barriers in the negotiations.104 The portrayal of the negotiations and its participants are 
overwhelmingly positive, while Arab populaces are presented as obstacles. 
 The perspective of An-Nahar is slightly less apparent because it uses a significant number 
of articles from the Associated Press; despite this, the effects of its domestic concerns on the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  (Zionist	  Jordanian	  Accord	  1978)	  
96	  (Mhyiddin	  Opposes	  COntacts	  with	  Zionists	  1978)	  
97	  (Problems	  of	  Over-­‐Population	  in	  Egypt	  1978)	  
98	  (Ahmed	  1978)	  
99	  (Iraq's	  Role	  in	  Arab	  Economic	  Integration	  Haild	  1978)	  
100	  (Saddam	  Hussein	  Visits	  Armed	  Forces	  in	  Dohuk,	  Nineveh	  Gvernorates	  1978)	  
101	  (Saddam	  Hussein	  Receives	  Arab	  Delegates:	  Joint	  Arab	  Action	  Urged	  1978)	  
102	  (Landau	  1978)	  
103	  (Blitzer,	  Adat:	  Can't	  afford	  to	  fail	  at	  Camp	  David	  1978)	  




it frames the Camp David negotiations can still be seen.  Unlike the Iraqi paper, the Lebanese 
paper almost never references an “Arab Nation” and rarely uses the term “Arab.”  The most 
distinct characteristic of An-Nahar is that it constantly covers Syria’s posture towards the 
negotiations. It specifically covers its rejection of a separate peace.  One emphasis unique to An-
Nahar was the occasional emphasis on the fruitlessness of war.105  While the paper seems to 
acknowledge that Lebanon’s internal and external struggles are inextricably linked to the Israeli-
Egyptian peace process, it sees its interests as being distinct from those of Syria, Egypt and 
Palestine, and as such refuses to allow its struggle to be subsumed by the larger pan-Arab 
struggle. 
 While the Iraqi paper paints a dualistic picture of “us” Arabs versus “them” Zionist, and 
the Israeli paper does much the same with less vitriolic rhetoric, the Lebanese paper manages to 
navigate around these simple dichotomies presenting a more complicated picture.106107 
 
Rebellion in Rhodesia 
 One of several populist rebellions that reached a crescendo during September of 1978 
was the revolutionary movement of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. While An-Nahar gives 
scant coverage to this issue, both the Baghdad Observer and The Jerusalem Post covered it over 
a long period of time.   
Again, the Baghdad Observer had the most simplistic portrayal of the events.  The 
rebellion, which sought to end the rule of a white minority, was personified by Joshua Nkomo.  
Other black leaders were ignored or portrayed as collaborators.108 All of Rhodesia’s white leaders 
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(implicitly citizens as well) are given the label racist.  Ian Smith, Rhodesia’s white prime 
minister, is portrayed as a racist foil to Nkomo, an anti-colonial new man.109  His at times 
unapologetic and indiscriminate violence seem heroic attempts at emancipation.  The Baghdad 
Observer constructs a dualism that eliminates any moral ambiguity, and reduces an event that 
encompasses complex processes to a cartoonish rivalry.  
 A stark departure from this characterization is that of the Jerusalem Post which, while 
presenting a more nuanced interpretation of the events, portrays Rhodesia’s white minority as 
victims and Ian Smith as a politician doing everything he can to appease a restive black 
majority.110111  The Jerusalem Post explains how Prime Minister Smith is involved in a gradual 
process to transfer power over the course of two years and is working with black moderates to 
achieve that goal.112113 Nkomo and his forces are depicted as being brutal and impatient (one 
might even say savage).114 Though, given the tactics that he may have employed, this title may 
have been accurate.115  To The Jerusalem Post’s credit when information regarding whether or 
not Nkomo’s troops were responsible for massacring civilian passengers of a plane that they had 
downed,116 the paper retracted the statement until they received eye-witness accounts of the 
events. 
 Though An-Nahar did not have any articles that were directly on Rhodesia, it did print 
one article on an emerging trend towards resistance to dictatorships around the world, and 
dedicated a couple of paragraphs to Rhodesia.  The paragraphs focused on how the Rhodesian 
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populace was splintered, and how Nkomo’s success was predicated upon his having the ability to 
take refuge in neighboring countries.117  The portrayals of the conflict in Rhodesia are strikingly 
different, and as will be discussed later, reflect the ontological framework of these countries’ 
domestic politics as much as it reflects the facts on the ground. 
 
Sandinistas 
 All three of the papers covered the Sandinista movement with a great deal of interest.  
The division was very similar to the case of Rhodesia except with fewer appeals to brutality and 
victimhood in The Jerusalem Post,118  Also, in the Baghdad Observer, General Somoza was 
portrayed as a puppet of the US.119120  While, both the Iraqi and the Israeli journals framed it 
essentially in a dualistic fashion, the Lebanese paper took a more fractured approach to the 
power dynamic, situating it within the dynamics of the Cold War,121 but also explaining how 
neighboring countries were beginning to get involved in order to avoid contagion.122 
 
The Lebanese Civil War 
The civil strife in Lebanon was a case where portrayals were not so dualistic, and actually 
evolved in response to the actions taken by the parties involved.  I did not analyze how An-
Nahar, the Lebanese journal, covered its domestic politics for two reasons: 1) This chapter is 
primarily concerned with how foreign news is covered. 2) Perhaps the deciding factor, however, 
was that there were too many stories to effectively analyze.  Despite this deficit, the 
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discrepancies in coverage between the Israeli and Iraqi newspapers were still significant and 
enlightening. As in the case of news coverage of Black Friday in Iran, the Iraqi newspaper 
tended to avoid religious signifiers, while the Israeli newspapers emphasized them. 
 The Baghdad Observer villainized “rightist militia groups” but never identifies their 
leaders or any other distinguishing characteristics.123  Initially it described Syrian forces in 
Lebanon as “deterrent forces.”124  This distinction provided legitimacy for their presence.  As the 
weeks progressed and violence escalated, “deterrent forces” was dropped and “security” or 
“military” forces became increasingly used.   This was particularly evident after Syrian forces 
attacked southeastern Beirut, using 2,000 heavy artillery shells in less than 12 hours.125  The 
Israelis are portrayed as a threat waiting in the wings to intervene as almost every article on 
Lebanon ends with an Israeli plane flying overhead.126  The Iraqi paper uses the threat of a 
further Israeli incursion to justify the Syrian presence in Lebanon. 
 The Jerusalem Post paints a completely different picture.  It depicts a melee where 
Christians are on the defensive against Syrian “peace” keepers, Palestinian insurgents, and 
Lebanese Muslims.127128  It sees itself as potentially having to intervene in order to maintain 
security.  While the Baghdad paper remained mildly neutral on the Syria issue, the Israelis 
present them as interlopers who overstayed their welcome and overstepped their UN mandate.129   
The Jerusalem Post’s stories give the impression that the Christian population is under threat and 
that the other Lebanese are complacent with regard to Palestinian Terrorist actions. 
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Common Themes and Frames 
A media outlet has a given set of frames that it can employ the range of which is 
dependent upon its interests and the ontological framework with which it analyzes the world.  
This is not to say that the application of these frames is always, or even usually, deliberate. 
Rather, it often becomes a matter of habit to use traditional justifications when actual evidence is 
unavailable.  The Baghdad Observer tended to resort to a dualistic view of the world that was 
anti-colonial, secular, and espoused a strong Arab nationalist sentiment.  The Jerusalem Post 
tended to take a more defensive view of the world, showcasing victimhood and emphasizing 
religious and ethnic differences.  An-Nahar tended to emphasize the role that international 
balance of power plays on politics and eschewed any rigid religious or ethnic causal relationships 
for conflicts.   
 An-Nahar used the most flexible ontological framework of the three, since it allowed for 
actors to pursue policies on the basis of procuring outside assistance.  This fact caused there to be 
diversity in how conflicts were portrayed based on the geopolitical situation of the country where 
the event was taking place.  It would seem as though the journalist at the paper applied its 
framework as best they could to the case of Iran.  The idea of a religious nationalist movement 
was not completely foreign, and Musa Al-Sadr had been an active populist religious leader.  
Their ontological framework did lead them to over emphasize the role of religion and 
underestimate the role the bazaris played in the demonstrations. 
 The Jerusalem Post showed the most diverse coverage in terms of international news, 
and because it used a significant amount of articles from international new agencies, this 
coverage tended to seem balanced; they included multiple view-points and consulted sources 




ontological framework with which it views the world was revealed through the narrow and 
restrictive frame with which it interpreted the event in Rhodesia. In reading the article, 
“Rhodesia a lesson in power politics,” it seems apparent that the Israeli writer could not help but 
identify with the Rhodesian white minority that was losing control of its regime as he listed three 
major mistakes that the regime in Rhodesia had made: 1) losing US backing; 2) making 
concessions without any reciprocity; and finally 3) not responding strongly enough to violent 
attacks.130  All three of these mistakes seem to be lessons that he wishes to teach other Israelis.  It 
would appear that the power struggle in Rhodesia was perceived as a threat with direct bearing 
on Israel’s legitimacy, causing a visceral response in the article’s author. 
 In contrast, the events leading up to and following Black Friday were described with little 
vitriol and no particularly restrictive framing.  It seems hard to believe that the journalists at a 
liberal Israeli media outlet would not perceive an Islamic movement as a threat.  The significant 
number of articles they published explaining Shi’ite Islam and the conditions that led to the 
popular outburst seems to support the impression that they did not feel threatened by a Shi’ite 
Islamic regime.  This lack of fear may be have been due to hopes that an Iran controlled by a 
minority sect within Islam could act as counterpoise to Sunni-led regimes and secular Arab 
nationalism.  It could also be that they did not view the demonstrations, though Islamic in nature, 
as seeking an Islamic government.  If a threat had been perceived, however, it seems as though 
the reporting would have been more biased as in the case of Rhodesia. 
 In the Baghdad Observer, stories were typically portrayed with an easily-identified hero 
and an easily-identified villain.  Both the cases of Rhodesia and Nicaragua show this tendency as 
Ian Smith and General Somoza were portrayed as villains, while Joshua Nkomo and the 
Sandinistas were anticolonial heroes. But again, this frame seems to have not been applied in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




case of Iran.  Ayatollah Khomeini or any number of opposition leaders could have made for 
good populist heroes, and yet the paper chose to ignore some of the movement’s most salient 
features, and even took an ambivalent attitude toward the Shah’s regime’s repressive tactics.  It 
would seem that the Iraqi newspaper could not figure out how to frame the story, so it did not 
try. Instead, it filtered out characters and events that might seem that could have resonated with 
the Iraqi populace such as the Shah and Khomeini.  In deciding between a populist cleric and a 
secular dictator, the paper chose to avoid the issue.  This particular type of ideological cleavage 
posed an impossible challenge for the ontological framework with which the paper traditionally 
worked. 
Conclusion 
The comparative analysis of this chapter shows how internal political dynamics can have 
an influence on how periodicals cover foreign events.  In particular it revealed the ways in which 
a Lebanese periodical’s coverage of civil unrest differed from periodicals from two other 
countries.  It also provides a point of comparison for how Lebanese print media covers the 














 In the conclusion to one of her articles, Sara El Richani (2013) talks about how the 
broadcasting landscape in Lebanon matches what Mouffe calls a “vibrant agnostic public 
space.”131  She writes this in response to Notzold’s assertion that television stations polarize and 
intensify conflict.132  My analysis seems to confirm a lot of what Notzold describes in her work: 
The broadcast stations talk past each other intensifying divergent perceptions of Lebanon’s 
political and social landscape.  El Richani goes on to assert that in times of crisis this agnosticism 
can turn into antagonism. My analysis suggests that while this may be true during times of 
“internal” crisis, the looming collapse of the Syrian regime has to a certain extent encouraged a 
convergence in the way print media present the crisis.   
The issue that Lebanon and its media present to the observer is the relationship between 
pluralism, integration, and democracy.  Scholars and political observers commonly refer to 
Lebanon as being a failure.  This evaluation is based on the idea that a proper democracy 
provides an arena for a “Habermasian universal rational consensus”133.  According to this ration, 
the continued disunity of confessional communities after 70 years of Lebanese independence is 
sign of a failure of the public sphere. El Richani tries to present this disunity as being a strength; 
it is an agnosticism that allows for discordant identities to live in the same geographic area under 
the same flag. 
 Though the idea of an agnostic public sphere is a more nuanced and less normative way 
of looking at the Lebanese media climate, it fails to fully explain the antagonism that is it at 
times cannot be ignored. Zizek’s combination of Mouffe and Hegel provides a slightly more 
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insightful way to look at the Lebanese media environment.134  Looking at the antagonism as the 
externalization of Lebanon’s religious communities’ insecurity with their internal cohesion 
explains how El Richani’s idea of the agnostic public sphere relates to my assertion that an aloof 
Syria provided stability by neutralizing internal conflict between conceptions of what Lebanon 
is.  It also explains how an active Syria polarizes the public sphere and increases antagonism.  
The question now becomes how a fractured Syria will affect Lebanon. 
 My analysis of print media suggests that the violent conflict in Syria has the potential to 
solidify division between the Syrian and Lebanese identity.  Both of the papers I examined began 
to use “Syrian People” with increased frequency as violence became more extreme.  All of the 
news sources used democratic values in suggesting solutions to Syria’s crisis and their domestic 
impasse.  There was an increased sense that a solution to the crisis should be created by the 
Syrian people.  Simultaneously, there were calls from multiple sources that Lebanese politics 
should not halt due to foreign problems.   
 Traditionally, Syria has been seen as a wedge issue that divides Lebanon’s population 
along sectarian lines.135136137  It is true that political cleavages seem to be determined by 
orientations towards the amount of influence that Syria should have.  Most US media sources 
assume that instability in Syria will cause instability in Lebanon.  My analysis seems to suggest 
that Lebanese instability is not a definite result of Syrian instability.  The threat of uncertainty 
abroad seems to be encouraging tenuous attempts at cooperation in strengthening democratic 
processes that articulate the will of Lebanese people.     
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 My research points to areas that require further research.  The data I collected from 
television news confirm Notzold’s (2013) assertion that television stations tend to cover a certain 
confessional community with higher intensity than the other communities.  This phenomenon 
leads to the question of what role television stations play in contributing to the character of 
Lebanon’s public sphere.  Do you they help conflict resolution by providing a space where 
communities get exposed to perspectives of people from other communities?  Do they help 
perpetuate conflict by reinforcing intra-confessional solidarity and inter-confessional 
antagonism?  The temporary convergence of al-Mustaqbal and as-Safir’s coverage suggests that 
media studies should look at the ways in which framing is affected by public opinion in addition 
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